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We apply formal methods to lay and streamline theoretical foundations to reason about Cyber-Physical Systems
(CPSs) and physics-based attacks, i.e., attacks targeting physical devices. We focus on a formal treatment of
both integrity and denial of service attacks to sensors and actuators of CPSs, and on the timing aspects of
these attacks. Our contributions are fourfold. (1) We define a hybrid process calculus to model both CPSs and
physics-based attacks. (2) We formalise a threat model that specifies MITM attacks that can manipulate sensor
readings or control commands in order to drive a CPS into an undesired state, and we provide the means
to assess attack tolerance/vulnerability with respect to a given attack. (3) We formalise how to estimate the
impact of a successful attack on a CPS and investigate possible quantifications of the success chances of an
attack. (4) We illustrate our definitions and results by formalising a non-trivial running example in Uppaal
SMC, the statistical extension of the Uppaal model checker; we use Uppaal SMC as an automatic tool for
carrying out a static security analysis of our running example in isolation and when exposed to three different
physics-based attacks with different impacts.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Context and motivation
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are integrations of networking and distributed computing systems
with physical processes that monitor and control entities in a physical environment, with feedback
loops where physical processes affect computations and vice versa. For example, in real-time control
systems, a hierarchy of sensors, actuators and control components are connected to control stations.
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In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the number of attacks to the security of
CPSs, e.g., manipulating sensor readings and, in general, influencing physical processes to bring the
system into a state desired by the attacker. Some notorious examples are: (i) the STUXnet worm,
which reprogrammed PLCs of nuclear centrifuges in Iran [36]; (ii) the attack on a sewage treatment
facility in Queensland, Australia, which manipulated the SCADA system to release raw sewage
into local rivers and parks [53]; (iii) the BlackEnergy cyber-attack on the Ukrainian power grid,
again compromising the SCADA system [32].
A common aspect of these attacks is that they all compromised safety critical systems, i.e., systems
whose failures may cause catastrophic consequences. Thus, as stated in [25, 26], the concern for
consequences at the physical level puts CPS security apart from standard information security, and
demands for ad hoc solutions to properly address such novel research challenges.
These ad hoc solutions must explicitly take into consideration a number of specific issues of
attacks tailored for CPSs. One main critical issue is the timing of the attack: the physical state
of a system changes continuously over time and, as the system evolves, some states might be
more vulnerable to attacks than others [34]. For example, an attack launched when the target state
variable reaches a local maximum (or minimum) may have a great impact on the whole system
behaviour, whereas the system might be able to tolerate the same attack if launched when that
variable is far from its local maximum or minimum [35]. Furthermore, not only the timing of the
attack but also the duration of the attack is an important parameter to be taken into consideration
in order to achieve a successful attack. For example, it may take minutes for a chemical reactor to
rupture [55], hours to heat a tank of water or burn out a motor, and days to destroy centrifuges [36].
Much progress has been done in the last years in developing formal approaches to aid the safety
verification of CPSs (e.g., [5, 19, 20, 29, 48, 49], to name a few). However, there is still a relatively
small number of works that use formal methods in the context of the security analysis of CPSs
(e.g., [2, 9, 11, 12, 46, 50, 57, 59]). In this respect, to the best of our knowledge, a systematic formal
approach to study physics-based attacks, that is, attacks targeting the physical devices (sensors and
actuators) of CPSs, is still to be fully developed. Our paper moves in this direction by relying on a
process calculus approach.
1.2 Background
The dynamic behaviour of the physical plant of a CPS is often represented bymeans of a discrete-time
state-space model1 consisting of two equations of the form
xk+1 = Axk + Buk +wk
yk = Cxk + ek
where xk ∈ R
n
is the current (physical) state, uk ∈ Rm is the input (i.e., the control actions
implemented through actuators) and yk ∈ R
p
is the output (i.e., the measurements from the
sensors). The uncertainty wk ∈ Rn and the measurement error ek ∈ Rp represent perturbation and
sensor noise, respectively, and A, B, and C are matrices modelling the dynamics of the physical
system. Here, the next state xk+1 depends on the current state xk and the corresponding control
actions uk , at the sampling instant k ∈ N. The state xk cannot be directly observed: only its
measurements yk can be observed.
The physical plant is supported by a communication network through which the sensor mea-
surements and actuator data are exchanged with controller(s) and supervisor(s) (e.g., IDSs), which
are the cyber components (also called logics) of a CPS.
1
See [61, 62] for a taxonomy of the time-scale models used to represent CPSs.
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1.3 Contributions
In this paper, we focus on a formal treatment of both integrity and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to
physical devices (sensors and actuators) of CPSs, paying particular attention to the timing aspects of
these attacks. The overall goal of the paper is to apply formal methodologies to lay theoretical foun-
dations to reason about and formally detect attacks to physical devices of CPSs. A straightforward
utilisation of these methodologies is for model-checking (as, e.g., in [20]) or monitoring (as, e.g.,
in [5]) in order to be able to verify security properties of CPSs either before system deployment
or, when static analysis is not feasible, at runtime to promptly detect undesired behaviours. In
other words, we aim at providing an essential stepping stone for formal and automated analysis
techniques for checking the security of CPSs (rather than for providing defence techniques, i.e.,
mitigation [45]).
Our contribution is fourfold. The first contribution is the definition of a hybrid process calculus,
called CCPSA, to formally specify both CPSs and physics-based attacks. In CCPSA, CPSs have two
components:
• a physical component denoting the physical plant (also called environment) of the system,
and containing information on state variables, actuators, sensors, evolution law, etc., and
• a cyber component that governs access to sensors and actuators, and channel-based commu-
nication with other cyber components.
Thus, channels are used for logical interactions between cyber components, whereas sensors and
actuators make possible the interaction between cyber and physical components.
CCPSA adopts a discrete notion of time [28] and it is equipped with a labelled transition semantics
(LTS) that allows us to observe both physical events (system deadlock and violations of safety condi-
tions) and cyber events (channel communications). Based on our LTS, we define two compositional
trace-based system preorders: a deadlock-sensitive trace preorder, ⊑, and a timed variant, ⊑m ..n ,
form ∈ N+ and n ∈ N+ ∪ {∞}, which takes into account discrepancies of execution traces within









simulates the execution traces of Sys
1
, except for the time intervalm..n; if n = ∞ then the
simulation only holds for the firstm − 1 time slots.
As a second contribution, we formalise a threat model that specifies man-in-the-middle (MITM)
attacks that can manipulate sensor readings or control commands in order to drive a CPS into an
undesired state [54].
2
Without loss of generality, MITM attacks targeting physical devices (sensors
or actuators) can be assimilated to physical attacks, i.e., those attacks that directly compromise
physical devices (e.g., electromagnetic attacks). As depicted in Figure 1, our attacks may affect
directly the sensor measurements or the controller commands:
• Attacks on sensors consist of reading and eventually replacing yk (the sensor measurements)
with yak .
• Attacks on actuators consist of reading, dropping and eventually replacing the controller
commands uk with u
a
k , affecting directly the actions the actuators may execute.
We group attacks into classes. A class of attacks takes into account both the potential malicious
activities I on physical devices and the timing parametersm and n of the attack: begin and end
of the attack. We represent a class C as a total function C ∈ [I → P (m..n)]. Intuitively, for ι ∈ I,
C (ι) ⊆ m..n denotes the set of time instants when an attack of classC may tamper with the device ι.
2
Note that we focus on attackers who have already entered the CPS, and we do not consider how they gained access to the
system (e.g., by attacking an Internet-accessible controller or one of the communication protocols as a Dolev-Yao-style
attacker [17] would do).






























































Fig. 1. MITM attacks to sensor readings and control commands
In order to make security assessments on our CPSs, we adopt a well-known approach called
Generalized Non Deducibility on Composition (GNDC) [18]. Thus, in our calculus CCPSA, we say that
a CPS Sys tolerates an attack A if
Sys ∥ A ⊑ Sys .
In this case, the presence of the attack A, does not change the (physical and logical) observable
behaviour of the system Sys, and the attack can be considered harmless.
On the other hand, we say that a CPS Sys is vulnerable to an attackA of classC ∈ [I → P (m..n)]
if there is a time interval m′..n′ in which the attack becomes observable (obviously, m′ ≥ m).
Formally, we write:
Sys ∥ A ⊑m′ ..n′ Sys .
We provide sufficient criteria to prove attack tolerance/vulnerability to attacks of an arbitrary
class C . We define a notion of most powerful attack of a given class C , Top(C ), and prove that if a
CPS tolerates Top(C ) then it tolerates all attacks A of class C (and of any weaker class3). Similarly,
if a CPS is vulnerable to Top(C ), in the time intervalm′..n′, then no attacks of class C (or weaker)
can affect the system out of that time interval. This is very useful when checking for attack
tolerance/vulnerability with respect to all attacks of a given class C .
As a third contribution, we formalise how to estimate the impact of a successful attack on a CPS.
As expected, risk assessment in industrial CPSs is a crucial phase preceding any defence strategy
implementation [1]. The objective of this phase is to prioritise among vulnerabilities; this is done
based on the likelihood that vulnerabilities are exploited, and the impact on the system under attack
if exploitation occurs. In this manner, the resources can then be focused on preventing the most
critical vulnerabilities [44]. We provide a metric to estimate the maximum perturbation introduced
in the system under attack with respect to its genuine behaviour, according to its evolution law and
the uncertainty of the model. Then, we prove that the impact of the most powerful attack Top(C )
represents an upper bound for the impact of any attack A of class C (or weaker).
Finally, as a fourth contribution, we formalise a running example in Uppaal SMC [16], the statis-
tical extension of the Uppaal model checker [7] supporting the analysis of systems expressed as
composition of timed and/or probabilistic automata. Our goal is to test Uppaal SMC as an automatic
tool for the static security analysis of a simple but significant CPS exposed to a number of different
physics-based attacks with different impacts on the system under attack. Here, we wish to remark
that while we have kept our running example simple, it is actually non-trivial and designed to
describe a wide number of attacks, as will become clear below.
This paper extends and supersedes a preliminary conference version that appeared in [40]. All
the results presented in the current paper have been formally proven, although, due to lack of
space, proofs of minor statements can be found in the associated technical report [39]. The Uppaal
SMC models of our system and the attacks that we have found are available at the repository
https://bitbucket.org/AndreiMunteanu/cps_smc/src/.
3
Intuitively, attacks of classes weaker than C can do less with respect to attacks of class C .
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1.4 Organisation
In Section 2, we give syntax and semantics of CCPSA. In Section 3, we provide our running example
and its formalisation in Uppaal SMC. In Section 4, we first define our threat model for physics-
based attacks, then we use Uppaal SMC to carry out a security analysis of our running example
when exposed to three different attacks, and, finally, we provide sufficient criteria for attack
tolerance/vulnerability. In Section 5, we estimate the impact of attacks on CPSs and prove that the
most powerful attack of a given class has the maximum impact with respect to all attacks of the same
class (or of a weaker one). In Section 6, we draw conclusions and discuss related and future work.
2 THE CALCULUS
In this section, we introduce our Calculus of Cyber-Physical Systems and Attacks, CCPSA, which
extends the Calculus of Cyber-Physical Systems, defined in our companion papers [38, 42], with
specific features to formalise and study attacks to physical devices.
Let us start with some preliminary notation.
2.1 Syntax of CCPSA
Notation 1. We use x ,xk for state variables (associated to physical states of systems), c,d for
communication channels, a,ak for actuator devices, and s, sk or sensors devices.
Actuator names are metavariables for actuator devices like valve, light, etc. Similarly, sensor names
are metavariables for sensor devices, e.g., a sensor thermometer that measures a state variable called
temperature, with a given precision.
Values, ranged over by v,v ′,w , are built from basic values, such as Booleans, integers and real
numbers; they also include names.
Given a generic set of names N , we write RN to denote the set of functions assigning a real value
to each name in N . For ξ ∈ RN , n ∈ N and v ∈ R, we write ξ [n 7→ v] to denote the function
ψ ∈ RN such that ψ (m) = ξ (m), for any m , n, and ψ (n) = v . Given two generic functions ξ1
and ξ2 with disjoint domains N1 and N2, respectively, we denote with ξ1 ∪ ξ2 the function such that
(ξ1 ∪ ξ2) (n) = ξ1 (n), if n ∈ N1, and (ξ1 ∪ ξ2) (n) = ξ2 (n), if n ∈ N2.
In general, a cyber-physical system consists of: (i) a physical component (defining state variables,
physical devices, physical evolution, etc.) and (ii) a cyber (or logical) component that interacts with
the physical devices (sensors and actuators) and communicates with other cyber components of
the same or of other CPSs.
Physical components in CCPSA are given by two sub-components: (i) the physical state, which is
supposed to change at runtime, and (ii) the physical environment, which contains static information.4
Definition 1 (Physical state). Let X be a set of state variables, S be a set of sensors, andA be a
set of actuators. A physical state S is a triple ⟨ξx, ξs, ξa⟩, where:
• ξx ∈ R
X is the state function,
• ξs ∈ R
S is the sensor function,
• ξa ∈ R
A is the actuator function.
All functions defining a physical state are total.
The state function ξx returns the current value associated to each variable inX, the sensor function
ξs returns the current value associated to each sensor in S and the actuator function ξa returns the
current value associated to each actuator in A.
4
Actually, this information is periodically updated (say, every six months) to take into account possible drifts of the system.
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Definition 2 (Physical environment). LetX be a set of state variables, S be a set of sensors, and
A be a set of actuators. A physical environment E is a 6-tuple ⟨evol,meas, inv, safe, ξw, ξe⟩, where:
• evol : RX × RA × RX → 2R
X
is the evolution map,
• meas : RX × RS → 2R
S
is the measurement map,
• inv ∈ 2R
X
is the invariant set,
• safe ∈ 2R
X
is the safety set,
• ξw ∈ R
X is the uncertainty function,
• ξe ∈ R
S is the sensor-error function.
All functions defining a physical environment are total functions.
The evolution map evol models the evolution law of the physical system, where changes made
on actuators may reflect on state variables. Given a state function, an actuator function, and an
uncertainty function, the evolution map evol returns the set of next admissible state functions. Since
we assume an uncertainty in our models, evol does not return a single state function but a set of
possible state functions.
The measurement map meas returns the set of next admissible sensor functions based on the
current state function. Since we assume error-prone sensors, meas does not return a single sensor
function but a set of possible sensor functions.
The invariant set inv represents the set of state functions that satisfy the invariant of the system.
A CPS that gets into a physical state with a state function that does not satisfy the invariant is in
deadlock. Similarly, the safety set safe represents the set of state functions that satisfy the safety
conditions of the system. Intuitively, if a CPS gets into an unsafe state, then its functionality may
get compromised.
The uncertainty function ξw returns the uncertainty (or accuracy) associated to each state variable.
Thus, given a state variable x ∈ X, ξw (x ) returns the maximum distance between the real value of
x , in an arbitrary moment in time, and its representation in the model. For ξw, ξ
′
w
∈ RX , we will
write ξw ≤ ξ
′
w
if ξw (x ) ≤ ξ
′
w
(x ), for any x ∈ X. The evolution map evol is obviously monotone with
respect to uncertainty: if ξw ≤ ξ
′
w
then evol (ξx, ξa, ξw) ⊆ evol (ξx, ξa, ξ ′w).
Finally, the sensor-error function ξe returns the maximum error associated to each sensor in S.
Let us now define formally the cyber component of a CPS in CCPSA. Our (logical) processes build
on Hennessy and Regan’s Timed Process Language TPL [28], basically, CCS enriched with a discrete
notion of time. We extend TPL with two main ingredients:
• two constructs to read values detected at sensors and write values on actuators, respectively;
• special constructs to represent malicious activities on physical devices.
The remaining constructs are the same as those of TPL.
Definition 3 (Processes). Processes are defined as follows:
P ,Q ::= nil  tick.P




 if (b) {P } else {Q }
 P\c
 H ⟨w̃⟩
π ::= rcv c (x )  snd c⟨v⟩
ϕ ::= read s (x )  writea⟨v⟩
µ ::= sniff s (x )  dropa(x )
 forgep⟨v⟩ .
We write nil for the terminated process. The process tick.P sleeps for one time unit and then
continues as P . We write P ∥ Q to denote the parallel composition of concurrent threads P and Q .
The process π .P denotes channel transmission. The construct ϕ .P denotes activities on physical
devices, i.e., sensor reading and actuator writing. The process ⌊µ .P⌋Q denotes MITM malicious
activities under timeout targeting physical devices (sensors and actuators). More precisely, we
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support sensor sniffing, drop of actuator commands, and integrity attacks on data coming from sensors
and addressed to actuators. Thus, for instance, ⌊dropa(x ).P⌋Q drops a command on the actuator a
supplied by the controller in the current time slot; otherwise, if there are no commands on a, it
moves to the next time slot and evolves into Q .
The process P\c is the channel restriction operator of CCS. We sometimes write P\{c1, c2, . . . , cn }
to mean P\c1\c2 · · · \cn . The process if (b) {P } else {Q } is the standard conditional, where b is a
decidable guard. In processes of the form tick.Q and ⌊µ .P⌋Q , the occurrence of Q is said to be
time-guarded. The process H ⟨w̃⟩ denotes (guarded) recursion.
We assume a set of process identifiers ranged over byH ,H1,H2. We writeH ⟨w1, . . . ,wk ⟩ to denote
a recursive process H defined via an equation H (x1, . . . ,xk ) = P , where (i) the tuple x1, . . . ,xk
contains all the variables that appear free in P , and (ii) P contains only guarded occurrences of
the process identifiers, such as H itself. We say that recursion is time-guarded if P contains only
time-guarded occurrences of the process identifiers. Unless explicitly stated our recursive processes
are always time-guarded.
In the constructs rcv c (x ).P , read s (x ).P , ⌊sniff s (x ).P⌋Q and ⌊dropa(x ).P⌋Q the variable x is said
to be bound. This gives rise to the standard notions of free/bound (process) variables and α -conversion.
A term is closed if it does not contain free variables, and we assume to always work with closed
processes: the absence of free variables is preserved at run-time. As further notation, we write
T {v/x } for the substitution of all occurrences of the free variable x in T with the value v .
Everything is in place to provide the definition of cyber-physical systems expressed in CCPSA.
Definition 4 (Cyber-physical system). Fixed a set of state variables X, a set of sensors S, and a
set of actuators A, a cyber-physical system in CCPSA is given by two main components:
• a physical component consisting of
– a physical environment E defined on X, S, and A, and
– a physical state S recording the current values associated to the state variables in X, the
sensors in S, and the actuators in A;
• a cyber component P that interacts with the sensors in S and the actuators A, and can
communicate, via channels, with other cyber components of the same or of other CPSs.
We write E; S Z P to denote the resulting CPS, and useM and N to range over CPSs. Sometimes, when
the physical environment E is clearly identified, we write S Z P instead of E; S Z P . CPSs of the form
S Z P are called environment-free CPSs.
The syntax of our CPSs is slightly too permissive as a process might use sensors and/or actuators
that are not defined in the physical state. To rule out ill-formed CPSs, we use the following definition.
Definition 5 (Well-formedness). Let E = ⟨evol,meas, inv, safe, ξw, ξe⟩ be a physical environ-
ment, let S = ⟨ξx, ξs, ξa⟩ be a physical state defined on a set of physical variables X, a set of sensors S,
and a set of actuators A, and let P be a process. The CPS E; S Z P is said to be well-formed if: (i) any
sensor mentioned in P is in the domain of the function ξs; (ii) any actuator mentioned in P is in the
domain of the function ξa.
In the rest of the paper, we will always work with well-formed CPSs and use the following
abbreviations.
Notation 2. We write µ .P for the process defined via the equation Q = ⌊µ .P⌋Q , where Q does not
occur in P . Further, we write
• ⌊µ⌋Q as an abbreviation for ⌊µ .nil⌋Q ,
• ⌊µ .P⌋ as an abbreviation for ⌊µ .P⌋nil,
• snd c and rcv c , when channel c is used for pure synchronisation,
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Table 1. LTS for processes
(Inpp)
−
rcv c (x ).P
cv


















−−−→ P ′ λ , tick
P ∥ Q
λ
−−−→ P ′ ∥ Q
(Read)
−
read s (x ).P
s?v








⌊sniff s (x ).P⌋Q
Es?v












































JbK = true P
λ
−−−→ P ′




JbK = false Q λ−−−→ Q ′


























−−−−−→ P ′ ∥ Q ′
• tickk .P as a shorthand for tick . . . tick.P , where the prefix tick appears k ≥ 0 consecutive times.
Finally, letM = E; S Z P , we writeM ∥ Q for E; S Z (P ∥ Q ), andM\c for E; S Z (P\c ).
2.2 Labelled transition semantics
In this subsection, we provide the dynamics of CCPSA in terms of a labelled transition system (LTS)
in the SOS style of Plotkin. First, we give in Table 1 an LTS for logical processes, then in Table 2 we
lift transition rules from processes to environment-free CPSs.
In Table 1, the meta-variable λ ranges over labels in the set {tick,τ , cv, cv,a!v, s?v, Ep!v, Ep?v}.
Rules (Outp), (Inpp) and (Com) serve to model channel communication, on some channel c . Rules
(Read) and (Write) denote sensor reading and actuator writing, respectively. The following three rules
model three different MITM malicious activities: sensor sniffing, dropping of actuator commands,
and integrity attacks on data coming from sensors or addressed to actuators. In particular, rule
(EActDrop E) models a DoS attack to the actuator a, where the update request of the controller is
dropped by the attacker and it never reaches the actuator, whereas rule (ESensIntegr E) models an
integrity attack on sensor s , as the controller of s is supplied with a fake value v forged by the
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Table 2. LTS for CPSs S Z P parametric on an environment E = ⟨evol,meas, inv, safe, ξw, ξe⟩
(Out)
S = ⟨ξx, ξs, ξa⟩ P
cv
−−−−→ P ′ ξx ∈ inv
S Z P
cv
−−−−→ S Z P ′
(Inp)
S = ⟨ξx, ξs, ξa⟩ P
cv
−−−−→ P ′ ξx ∈ inv
S Z P
cv




−−−−−→ P ′ ξs (s ) = v P
Es !v
−−−−−−↛ ξx ∈ inv
⟨ξx, ξs, ξa⟩Z P
τ





−−−−−−−→ P ′ ξs (s ) = v ξx ∈ inv
⟨ξx, ξs, ξa⟩Z P
τ





−−−−−→ P ′ ξ ′
a
= ξa[a 7→ v] P
Ea?v
−−−−−−−↛ ξx ∈ inv
⟨ξx, ξs, ξa⟩Z P
τ







−−−−−−−→ P ′ ξ ′
a
= ξa[a 7→ v] ξx ∈ inv
⟨ξx, ξs, ξa⟩Z P
τ







−−−→ P ′ ξx ∈ inv
⟨ξx, ξs, ξa⟩Z P
τ
−−−→ ⟨ξx, ξs, ξa⟩Z P
′
(Deadlock)
S = ⟨ξx, ξs, ξa⟩ ξx < inv
S Z P
deadlock




−−−−−→ P ′ S = ⟨ξx, ξs, ξa⟩ S
′ ∈ next(E; S ) ξx ∈ inv
S Z P
tick
−−−−−→ S ′ Z P ′
(Safety)
S = ⟨ξx, ξs, ξa⟩ ξx < safe ξx ∈ inv
S Z P
unsafe
−−−−−−−−→ S Z P
attack. Rule (Par) propagates untimed actions over parallel components. Rules (Res), (Rec), (Then)
and (Else) are standard. The following four rules (TimeNil), (Sleep), (TimeOut) and (TimePar)model the
passage of time. For simplicity, we omit the symmetric counterparts of the rules (Com), (EActDrop E),
(ESensIntegr E), and (Par).
In Table 2, we lift the transition rules from processes to environment-free CPSs of the form
S Z P for S = ⟨ξx, ξs, ξa⟩. The transition rules are parametric on a physical environment E. Except
for rule (Deadlock), all rules have a common premise ξx ∈ inv: a system can evolve only if the
invariant is satisfied by the current physical state. Here, actions, ranged over by α , are in the set
{τ , cv, cv, tick, deadlock, unsafe}. These actions denote: internal activities (τ ); channel transmission
(cv and cv); the passage of time (tick); and two specific physical events: system deadlock (deadlock)
and the violation of the safety conditions (unsafe). Rules (Out) and (Inp) model transmission and
reception, with an external system, on a channel c . Rule (SensRead)models the reading of the current
data detected at a sensor s ; here, the presence of a malicious action Es!w would prevent the reading
of the sensor. We already said that rule (ESensIntegr E) of Table 1 models integrity attacks on a sensor
s . However, together with rule (SensRead), it also serves to implicitly model DoS attacks on a sensor
s , as the controller of s cannot read its correct value if the attacker is currently supplying a fake
value for it. Rule (ESensSniffE) allows the attacker to read the confidential value detected at a sensor
s . Rule (ActWrite) models the writing of a value v on an actuator a; here, the presence of an attack
capable of performing a drop action Ea?v prevents the access to the actuator by the controller.
Rule (EActIntegrE) models a MITM integrity attack to an actuator a, as the actuator is provided with
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a value forged by the attack. Rule (Tau) lifts non-observable actions from processes to systems.
This includes communications channels and attacks’ accesses to physical devices. A similar lifting
occurs in rule (Time) for timed actions, where next(E; S ) returns the set of possible physical states











⟩ : ξ ′
x
∈ evol (ξx, ξa, ξw) ∧ ξ ′s ∈ meas(ξ
′
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Thus, by an application of rule (Time) a CPS moves to the next physical state, in the next time slot.
Rule (Deadlock) is introduced to signal the violation of the invariant. When the invariant is violated,
a system deadlock occurs and then, in CCPSA, the system emits a special action deadlock, forever.
Similarly, rule (Safety) is introduced to detect the violation of safety conditions. In this case, the
system may emit a special action unsafe and then continue its evolution.
Summarising, in the LTS of Table 2 we define transitions rules of the form S Z P
α
−−−→ S ′ Z P ′,
parametric on some physical environment E. As physical environments do not change at runtime,
S Z P
α
−−−→ S ′ Z P ′ entails E; S Z P
α
−−−→ E; S ′ Z P ′, thus providing the LTS for all CPSs in CCPSA.
Remark 1. Note that our operational semantics ensures that malicious actions of the form Es!v
(integrity/DoS attack on sensor s) or Ea?v (DoS attack on actuator a) have a pre-emptive power. These
attacks can always prevent the regular access to a physical device by its controller.
2.3 Behavioural semantics
Having defined the actions that can be performed by a CPS of the form E; S Z P , we can easily
concatenate these actions to define the possible execution traces of the system. Formally, given a
trace t = α1 . . . αn , we will write
t
−−−→ as an abbreviation for
α1
−−−−→ . . .
αn
−−−−→, and we will use the
function #tick(t ) to get the number of occurrences of the action tick in t .
The notion of trace allows us to provide a formal definition of system soundness: a CPS is said
to be sound if it never deadlocks and never violates the safety conditions.
Definition 6 (System soundness). Let M be a well-formed CPS. We say that M is sound if
wheneverM
t
−−−→ M ′, for some t , the actions deadlock and unsafe never occur in t .
In our security analysis, we will always focus on sound CPSs.
We recall that the observable activities in CCPSA are: time passing, system deadlock, violation of
safety conditions, and channel communication. Having defined a labelled transition semantics, we
are ready to formalise our behavioural semantics, based on execution traces.









=⇒ denotes ==⇒ if α = τ and
α
=⇒ otherwise. Given a trace t = α1. . .αn , we
write
t̂
===⇒ as an abbreviation for
α̂1
====⇒ . . .
α̂n
====⇒.
Definition 7 (Trace preorder). We writeM ⊑ N if wheneverM
t
−−−→ M ′, for some t , there is N ′
such that N t̂===⇒ N ′.
Remark 2. Unlike other process calculi, in CCPSA our trace preorder is able to observe (physical)
deadlock due to the presence of the rule (Deadlock) and the special action deadlock: wheneverM ⊑ N
thenM eventually deadlocks if and only if N eventually deadlocks (see Lemma 1 in the appendix).
Our trace preorder can be used for compositional reasoning in those contexts that don’t interfere
on physical devices (sensors and actuators) while they may interfere on logical components (via
channel communication). In particular, trace preorder is preserved by parallel composition of
physically-disjoint CPSs, by parallel composition of pure-logical processes, and by channel restriction.
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Intuitively, two CPSs are physically-disjoint if they have different plants but they may share logical
channels for communication purposes. More precisely, physically-disjoint CPSs have disjoint state
variables and disjoint physical devices (sensors and actuators). As we consider only well-formed
CPSs (Definition 5), this ensures that a CPS cannot physically interfere with a parallel CPS by
acting on its physical devices.







⟩ and Ei = ⟨evoli ,measi , invi , safei , ξ iw, ξ
i
e
⟩ be physical states and
physical environments, respectively, associated to sets of state variables Xi , sets of sensors Si , and
sets of actuators Ai , for i ∈ {1, 2}. For X1 ∩ X2 = ∅, S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ and A1 ∩ A2 = ∅, we define:
• the disjoint union of the physical states S1 and S2, written S1 ⊎ S2, to be the physical state
















• the disjoint union of the physical environments E1 and E2, written E1 ⊎ E2, to be the physical
environment ⟨evol,meas, inv, safe, ξw, ξe⟩ such that:
(1) evol = evol1 ∪ evol2
(2) meas = meas1 ∪meas2
(3) S1 ⊎ S2 ∈ inv iff S1 ∈ inv1 and S2 ∈ inv2
(4) S1 ⊎ S2 ∈ safe iff S1 ∈ safe1 and S2 ∈ safe2











Definition 8 (Physically-disjoint CPSs). Let Mi = Ei ; Si Z Pi , for i ∈ {1, 2}. We say that M1
andM2 are physically-disjoint if S1 and S2 have disjoint sets of state variables, sensors and actuators.
In this case, we writeM1 ⊎M2 to denote the CPS defined as (E1 ⊎ E2); (S1 ⊎ S2) Z (P1 ∥ P2).
A pure-logical process is a process that may interfere on communication channels but it never
interferes on physical devices as it never accesses sensors and/or actuators. Basically, a pure-logical
process is a TPL process [28]. Thus, in a systemM ∥ Q , whereM is an arbitrary CPS, a pure-logical
process Q cannot interfere with the physical evolution ofM . A process Q can, however, definitely
interact withM via communication channels, and hence affect its observable behaviour.
Definition 9 (Pure-logical processes). A process P is called pure-logical if it never acts on
sensors and/or actuators.
Now, we can finally state the compositionality of our trace preorder ⊑ (the proof can be found in
the appendix).
Theorem 1 (Compositionality of ⊑). LetM and N be two arbitrary CPSs in CCPSA.
(1) M ⊑ N impliesM ⊎O ⊑ N ⊎O , for any physically-disjoint CPS O ;
(2) M ⊑ N impliesM ∥ P ⊑ N ∥ P , for any pure-logical process P ;
(3) M ⊑ N impliesM\c ⊑ N \c , for any channel c .
The reader may wonder whether our trace preorder ⊑ is preserved by more permissive contexts.
The answer is no. Suppose that in the second item of Theorem 1 we allowed a process P that can
also read on sensors. In this case, even ifM ⊑ N , the parallel process P might read a different value
in the two systems at the very same sensor s (due to the sensor error) and transmit these different
values on a free channel, breaking the congruence. Activities on actuators may also lead to different
behaviours of the compound systems:M and N may have physical components that are not exactly
aligned. A similar reasoning applies when composing CPSs with non physically-disjoint ones: noise
on physical devices may break the compositionality result.
As we are interested in formalising timing aspects of attacks, such as beginning and duration,
we propose a timed variant of ⊑ up to (a possibly infinite) discrete time intervalm..n, withm ∈ N+


























































Fig. 2. The main structure of the CPS Sys
and n ∈ N+ ∪∞. Intuitively, we writeM ⊑m ..n N if the CPS N simulates the execution traces ofM
in all time slots, except for those contained in the discrete time intervalm..n.
Definition 10 (Trace preorder up to a time interval). We write M ⊑m ..n N , form ∈ N+
and n ∈ N+ ∪ {∞}, withm ≤ n, if the following conditions hold:
• m is the minimum integer for which there is a trace t , with #tick(t )=m−1, s.t.M
t
−−−→ and N ̸ t̂===⇒;
• n is the infimum element of N+ ∪ {∞}, n ≥ m, such that wheneverM
t1
−−−→ M ′, with #tick(t1) =
n − 1, there is t2, with #tick(t1) = #tick(t2), such that N
t2
−−−→ N ′, for some N ′, andM ′ ⊑ N ′.
In Definition 10, the first item says that N can simulate the traces of M for at mostm−1 time
slots; whereas the second item says two things: (i) in time intervalm..n the simulation does not
hold; (ii) starting from the time slot n+1 the CPS N can simulate again the traces ofM . Note that
inf (∅) = ∞. Thus, ifM ⊑m ..∞ N , then N simulatesM only in the firstm − 1 time slots.
Theorem 2 (Compositionality of ⊑m ..n ). LetM and N be two arbitrary CPSs in CCPSA.
(1) M ⊑m ..n N implies that for any physically-disjoint CPS there are m′,n′ ∈ N+ ∪ ∞, with
m′..n′ ⊆ m..n such thatM ⊎O ⊑m′ ..n′ N ⊎O ;
(2) M ⊑m ..n N implies that for any pure-logical process P there are m′,n′ ∈ N+ ∪ ∞, with
m′..n′ ⊆ m..n such thatM ∥ P ⊑m′ ..n′ N ∥ P ;
(3) M ⊑m ..n N implies that for any channel c there arem′,n′ ∈ N+ ∪∞, withm′..n′ ⊆ m..n such
thatM\c ⊑m′ ..n′ N \c .
The proof can be found in the appendix.
3 A RUNNING EXAMPLE
In this section, we introduce a running example to illustrate how we can precisely represent CPSs
and a variety of different physics-based attacks. In practice, we formalise a relatively simple CPS
Sys in which the temperature of an engine is maintained within a specific range by means of a
cooling system. We wish to remark here that while we have kept the example simple, it is actually
far from trivial and designed to describe a wide number of attacks. The main structure of the CPS
Sys is shown in Figure 2.
3.1 The CPS Sys
The physical state State of the engine is characterised by: (i) a state variable temp containing the
current temperature of the engine, and an integer state variable stress keeping track of the level of
stress of the mechanical parts of the engine due to high temperatures (exceeding 9.9 degrees); this
integer variable ranges from 0, meaning no stress, to 5, for high stress; (ii) a sensor st (such as a
thermometer or a thermocouple) measuring the temperature of the engine, (iii) an actuator cool to
turn on/off the cooling system.
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The physical environment of the engine, Env, is constituted by: (i) a simple evolution law evol that
increases (respectively, decreases) the value of temp by one degree per time unit, when the cooling
system is inactive (respectively, active), up to the uncertainty of the system; the variable stress is
increased each time the current temperature is above 9.9 degrees, and dropped to 0 otherwise; (ii) a
measurement map meas returning the value detected by the sensor st , up to the error associated to
the sensor; (iii) an invariant set saying that the system gets faulty when the temperature of the
engine gets out of the range [0, 50], (iv) a safety set to express that the system moves to an unsafe
state when the level of stress reaches the threshold 5, (v) an uncertainty function in which each
state variable may evolve with an uncertainty δ = 0.4 degrees, (vi) a sensor-error function saying
that the sensor st has an accuracy ϵ = 0.1 degrees.
Formally, State = ⟨ξx, ξs, ξa⟩ where:
• ξx ∈ R
{temp,stress }
and ξx (temp) = 0 and ξx (stress) = 0;
• ξs ∈ R
{st }
and ξs (st) = 0;
• ξa ∈ R
{cool }
and ξa (cool) = off; for the sake of simplicity, we can assume ξa to be a mapping
{cool} → {on, off} such that ξa (cool) = off if ξa (cool) ≥ 0, and ξa (cool) = on if ξa (cool) < 0;
and Env = ⟨evol,meas, inv, safe, ξw, ξe⟩ with:




, ξw) is the set of functions ξ ∈ R
{temp,stress }
such that:
– ξ (temp) = ξ i
x
(temp) + heat (ξ i
a
, cool) + γ , with γ ∈ [−δ ,+δ] and heat (ξ i
a
, cool) = −1 if
ξ i
a
(cool) = on (active cooling), and heat (ξ i
a
, cool) = +1 if ξ i
a
(cool) = off (inactive cooling);
– ξ (stress) = min(5 , ξ i
x
(stress)+1) if ξ i
x





ξ : ξ (st) ∈ [ξ
i
x





• inv = {ξ i
x
: 0 ≤ ξ i
x
(temp) ≤ 50};




(stress) < 5} (we recall that the stress threshold is 5);
• ξw ∈ R
{temp,stress }
, ξw (temp) = 0.4 = δ and ξw (stress) = 0;
• ξe ∈ R
{st }
and ξe (st) = 0.1 = ϵ .
For the cyber component of the CPS Sys, we define two parallel processes: Ctrl and IDS. The
former models the controller activity, consisting in reading the temperature sensor and in governing
the cooling system via its actuator, whereas the latter models a simple intrusion detection system that
attempts to detect and signal anomalies in the behaviour of the system [24]. Intuitively, Ctrl senses
the temperature of the engine at each time slot. When the sensed temperature is above 10 degrees,
the controller activates the coolant. The cooling activity is maintained for 5 consecutive time units.
After that time, the controller synchronises with the IDS component via a private channel sync,
and then waits for instructions, via a channel ins. The IDS component checks whether the sensed
temperature is still above 10. If this is the case, it sends an alarm of “high temperature”, via a specific
channel, and then tells Ctrl to keep cooling for 5 more time units; otherwise, if the temperature is
not above 10, the IDS component requires Ctrl to stop the cooling activity.
Ctrl = read st (x ).if (x > 10) {Cooling} else {tick.Ctrl}
Cooling = write cool⟨on⟩.tick5.Check
Check = snd sync.rcv ins(y).if (y = keep_cooling) {tick5.Check} else {write cool⟨off⟩.tick.Ctrl}
IDS = rcv sync.read st (x ).if (x > 10) {snd alarm⟨high_temp⟩.snd ins⟨keep_cooling⟩.tick.IDS}
else {snd ins⟨stop⟩.tick.IDS} .
Thus, the whole CPS is defined as:
Sys = Env; State Z (Ctrl ∥ IDS)\{sync, ins}
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Fig. 3. Three possible evolutions of the CPS Sys
For the sake of simplicity, our IDS component is quite basic: for instance, it does not checkwhether
the temperature is too low. However, it is straightforward to replace it with a more sophisticated
one, containing more informative tests on sensor values and/or on actuators commands.
Figure 3 shows three possible evolutions in time of the state variable temp of Sys: (i) the first
one (in red), in which the temperature of the engine always grows of 1 − δ = 0.6 degrees per time
unit, when the cooling is off, and always decrease of 1 + δ = 1.4 degrees per time unit, when the
cooling is on; (ii) the second one (in blue), in which the temperature always grows of 1 + δ = 1.4
degrees per time unit, when the cooling is off, and always decreases of 1 − δ = 0.6 degrees per time
unit, when the cooling is on; (iii) and a third one (in yellow), in which, depending on whether the
cooling is off or on, at each time step the temperature grows or decreases of an arbitrary offset
lying in the interval [1 − δ , 1 + δ ].
Our operational semantics allows us to formally prove a number of properties of our running
example. For instance, Proposition 1 says that the Sys is sound and it never fires the alarm.
Proposition 1. If Sys
t
−−−→ for some trace t = α1 . . . αn , then αi ∈ {τ , tick}, for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
Actually, we can be quite precise on the temperature reached by Sys before and after the cooling:
in each of the 5 rounds of cooling, the temperature will drop of a value lying in the real interval
[1−δ , 1+δ ], where δ is the uncertainty.
Proposition 2. For any execution trace of Sys, we have:
• when Sys turns on the cooling, the value of the state variable temp ranges over (9.9, 11.5];
• when Sys turns off the cooling, the value of the variable temp ranges over (2.9, 8.5].
The proofs of the Propositions 1 and 2 can be found in the associated technical report [39]. In
the following section, we will verify the safety properties stated in these two propositions relying
on the statistical model checker Uppaal SMC [16].
3.2 A formalisation of Sys in Uppaal SMC
In this section, we formalise our running example in Uppaal SMC [16], the statistical extension of
the Uppaal model checker [7] supporting the analysis of systems expressed as composition of timed
and/or probabilistic automata. In Uppaal SMC, the user must specify two main statistical parameters
α and ϵ , ranging in the interval [0, 1], and representing the probability of false negatives and
probabilistic uncertainty, respectively. Thus, given a CTL property of the system under investigation,
the tool returns a probability estimate for that property, lying in a confidence interval [p − ϵ , p + ϵ],
for some probability p ∈ [0, 1], with an accuracy 1 − α . The number of necessary runs to ensure
the required accuracy is then computed by the tool relying on the Chernoff-Hoeffding theory [13].
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Fig. 4. Uppaal SMC model for the physical component of Sys
Fig. 5. Uppaal SMC model for the network component of Sys
3.2.1 Model. The Uppaal SMC model of our use case Sys is given by three main components
represented in terms of parallel timed automata: the physical component, the network, and the logical
component.
The physical component, whose model is shown in Figure 4, consists of four automata: (i) the
_Engine_ automaton that governs the evolution of the variable temp by means of the heat and cool
functions; (ii) the _Sensor_ automaton that updates the global variable sens at each measurement re-
quest; (iii) the _Actuator_ automaton that activates/deactivates the cooling system; (iv) the _Safety_
automaton that handles the integer variable stress, via the update_stress function, and the Boolean
variables safe and deadlocks, associated to the safety set safe and the invariant set inv of Sys, respec-
tively.
5
We also have a small automaton to model a discrete notion of time (via a synchronisation
channel tick) as the evolution of state variables is represented via difference equations.
The network, whose model is given in Figure 5, consists of two proxies: a proxy to relay actuator
commands between the actuator device and the controller, a second proxy to relay measurement
requests between the sensor device and the logical components (controller and IDS).
The logical component, whose model is given in Figure 6, consists of two automata: _Ctrl_ and
_IDS_ to model the controller and the Intrusion Detection System, respectively; both of them
synchronise with their associated proxy copying a fresh value of sens into their local variables
(sens_ctrl and sens_ids, respectively). Under proper conditions, the _IDS_ automaton fires alarms
by setting a Boolean variable alarm.
3.2.2 Verification. We conduct our safety verification using a notebook with the following
set-up: (i) 2.8 GHz Intel i7 7700 HQ, with 16 GB memory, and Linux Ubuntu 16.04 operating system;
5
In Section 6.2, we explain why we need to implement an automaton to check for safety conditions rather than verifying a
safety property.
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Fig. 6. Uppaal SMC model for the logical component of Sys
(ii) Uppaal SMC model-checker 64-bit, version 4.1.19. The statistical parameters of false negatives
(α ) and probabilistic uncertainty (ϵ) are both set to 0.01, leading to a confidence level of 99%. As
a consequence, having fixed these parameters, for each of our experiments, Uppaal SMC run a
number of runs that may vary from a few hundreds to 26492 (cf. Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds).
We basically use Uppaal SMC to verify properties expressed in terms of time bounded CTL
formulae of the form □[t1,t2]eprop and ♢[0,t2]eprop
6
, where t1 and t2 are time instants according
to the discrete representation of time in Uppaal SMC. In practice, we use formulae of the form
□[t1,t2]eprop to compute the probability that a property eprop
7
holds in all time slots of the time
interval t1..t2, whereas with formulae of the form ♢[0,t2]eprop we calculate the probability that a
property eprop holds in a least one time slot of the time interval 0..t2.
Thus, instead of proving Proposition 1, we verify, with a 99% accuracy, that in all possible
executions that are at most 1000 time slots long, the system Sys results to be sound and alarm free,
with probability 0.99. Formally, we verify the following three properties:
• □[1,1000] (¬deadlocks), expressing that the system does not deadlock;
• □[1,1000] (safe), expressing that the system does not violate the safety conditions;
• □[1,1000] (¬alarm), expressing that the IDS does not fire any alarm.
Furthermore, instead of Proposition 2, we verify, with the same accuracy and for runs of the
same length (up to a short initial transitory phase lasting 5 time instants) that if the cooling system
is off, then the temperature of the engine lies in the real interval (2.9, 8.5], otherwise it ranges over
the interval (9.9, 11.5]. Formally, we verify the following two properties:
• □[5,1000] (Cooling_off =⇒ (temp > 2.9 ∧ temp ≤ 8.5))
• □[5,1000] (Cooling_on =⇒ (temp > 9.9 ∧ temp ≤ 11.5)).
The verification of each of the five properties above requires around 15 minutes. The Uppaal SMC
models of our system and the attacks discussed in the next section are available at the repository
https://bitbucket.org/AndreiMunteanu/cps_smc/src/.
Remark 3 (On upper-bound analysis). In our Uppaal SMC model we decided to represent both
uncertainty of physical evolution (in the functions heat and cool of _Engine_) and measurement noise
(in _Sensor_) in a probabilistic manner via random extractions. Here, the reader may wonder whether
it would have been enough to restrict our SMC analysis by considering only upper bounds on these two
quantities. Actually, this is not the case. In fact, suppose to consider only execution traces in which the
physical uncertainty is always either 0.4 or −0.4. Then, the reachable temperatures are always of the
6
The 0 in the left-hand side of the time interval is imposed by the syntax of Uppaal SMC.
7eprop is a side-effect free expression over variables (e.g., clock variables, location names and primitive variables) [7].
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form n.k , for n,k ∈ N and k even (e.g., there is no way to reach the maximum admissible temperature
of 11.5 degrees).
4 PHYSICS-BASED ATTACKS
In this section, we use CCPSA to formalise a threat model of physics-based attacks, i.e., attacks that
can manipulate sensor and/or actuator signals in order to drive a sound CPS into an undesired
state [54]. An attack may have different levels of access to physical devices; for example, it might
be able to get read access to the sensors but not write access; or it might get write-only access to
the actuators but not read-access. This level of granularity is very important to model precisely
how physics-based attacks can affect a CPS [14].
In CCPSA, we have a syntactic way to distinguish malicious processes from honest ones.
Definition 11 (Honest system). A CPS E; S Z P is honest if P is honest, where P is honest if it
does not contain constructs of the form ⌊µ .P1⌋P2.
We group physics-based attacks in classes that describe both the malicious activities and the
timing aspects of the attack. Intuitively, a class of attacks provides information about which physical
devices are accessed by the attacks of that class, how they are accessed (read and/or write), when the
attack begins and when the attack ends. Thus, let I be the set of all possible malicious activities on
the physical devices of a system,m ∈ N+ be the time slot when an attack starts, and n ∈ N+ ∪ {∞}
be the time slot when the attack ends. We then say that an attackA is of classC ∈ [I → P (m..n)] if:
(1) all possible malicious activities of A coincide with those contained in I;
(2) the first of those activities may occur in themth time slot but not before;
(3) the last of those activities may occur in the nth time slot but not after;
(4) for ι ∈ I, C (ι) returns a (possibly empty) set of time slots when A may read/tamper with the
device ι (this set is contained inm..n);
(5) C is a total function, i.e., if no attacks of classC can achieve the malicious activity ι ∈ I, then
C (ι) = ∅.
Definition 12 (Class of attacks). Let I = {Ep? : p ∈ S ∪ A} ∪ {Ep! : p ∈ S ∪ A} be the set of
all possible malicious activities on physical devices. Letm ∈ N+, n ∈ N+ ∪ {∞}, withm ≤ n. A class
of attacks C ∈ [I → P (m..n)] is a total function such that for any attack A of class C we have:




−−−−→ A′ ∧ k = #tick(t ) + 1}, for ι ∈ I,
(ii) m = inf { k : k ∈ C (ι) ∧ ι ∈ I },
(iii) n = sup{ k : k ∈ C (ι) ∧ ι ∈ I }.
Along the lines of [18], we can say that an attack A affects a sound CPS M if the execution of
the compound systemM ∥ A differs from that of the original systemM , in an observable manner.
Basically, a physics-based attack can influence the system under attack in at least two different ways:
• The system M ∥ A might deadlock when M may not; this means that the attack A affects
the availability of the system. We recall that in the context of CPSs, deadlock is a particular
severe physical event.
• The systemM ∥ Amight have non-genuine execution traces containing observables (viola-
tions of safety conditions or communications on channels) that can’t be reproduced byM ;
here the attack affects the integrity of the system behaviour.
Definition 13 (Attack tolerance/vulnerability). LetM be an honest and sound CPS. We say
thatM is tolerant to an attack A ifM ∥ A ⊑ M . We say thatM is vulnerable to an attack A if there
is a time intervalm..n, withm ∈ N+ and n ∈ N+ ∪ {∞}, such thatM ∥ A ⊑m ..n M .
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Thus, if a system M is vulnerable to an attack A of class C ∈ [I → P (m..n)], during the time
intervalm′..n′, then the attack operates during the intervalm..n but it influences the system under
attack in the time intervalm′..n′ (obviously, m′ ≥ m). If n′ is finite, then we have a temporary
attack, otherwise we have a permanent attack. Furthermore, ifm′ − n is big enough and n −m
is small, then we have a quick nasty attack that affects the system late enough to allow attack
camouflages [25]. On the other hand, ifm′ is significantly smaller than n, then the attack affects the
observable behaviour of the system well before its termination and the CPS has good chances of




−−−−−−−−−→, for some trace t ,
then we say that the attackA is lethal, as it is capable to halt (deadlock) the CPSM . This is obviously
a permanent attack.
Note that, according to Definition 13, the tolerance (or vulnerability) of a CPS also depends on
the capability of the IDS component to detect and signal undesired physical behaviours. In fact, the
IDS component might be designed to detect abnormal physical behaviours going well further than
deadlocks and violations of safety conditions.
According to the literature, we say that an attack is stealthy if it is able to drive the CPS under
attack into an incorrect physical state (either deadlock or violation of the safety conditions) without
being noticed by the IDS component.
4.1 Three different attacks on the physical devices of the CPS Sys
In this subsection, we present three different attacks to the CPS Sys described in Section 3. The
formal proofs of the propositions stating the tolerance and/or the vulnerability of Sys with respect
to these three attacks can be found in the associated technical report [39]. Here, we use Uppaal SMC
to verify the models associated to the system under attack in order to detect deadlocks, violations
of safety conditions, and IDS failures.
Example 1. Consider the following DoS/Integrity attack on the the actuator cool, of class C ∈
[I → P (m..m)] with C (Ecool?) = C (Ecool !) = {m} and C (ι) = ∅, for ι < {Ecool?, Ecool !}:
Am = tickm−1.⌊drop cool (x ).if (x=off) {forge cool⟨off⟩} else {nil}⌋ .
Here, the attackAm operates exclusively in themth time slot, when it tries to drop an eventual cooling
command (on or off) coming from the controller, and fabricates a fake command to turn off the cooling
system. Thus, if the controller sends in the mth time slot a command to turn off the coolant, then
nothing bad happens as the attack will put the same message back. On the hand, if the controller sends
a command to turn the cooling on, then the attack will drop the command. We recall that the controller
will turn on the cooling only if the sensed temperature is greater than 10 (and hence temp > 9.9);
this may happen only ifm > 8. Since the command to turn the cooling on is never re-sent by Ctrl,
the temperature will continue to rise, and after only 4 time units the system may violate the safety
conditions emitting an action unsafe, while the IDS component will start sending alarms every 5 time
units, until the whole system deadlocks because the temperature reaches the threshold of 50 degrees.
Here, the IDS component of Sys is able to detect the attack with only one time unit delay.
Proposition 3. Let Sys be our running example and Am be the attack defined in Example 1. Then,
• Sys ∥ Am ⊑ Sys, for 1 ≤ m ≤ 8,
• Sys ∥ Am ⊑m+4..∞ Sys, form > 8.
In order to support the statement of Proposition 3 we verify our Uppaal SMC model of Sys in
which the communication network used by the controller to access the actuator is compromised.
More precisely, we replace the _Proxy_Actuator_ automaton of Figure 5 with a compromised one,
provided in Figure 7, that implements the malicious activities of the MITM attackerAm of Example 1.


















































A Formal Approach to Physics-Based Attacks in Cyber-Physical Systems 0:19
Fig. 7. Uppaal SMC model for the attacker Am of Example 1
Wehave done our analysis, with a 99% accuracy, for execution traces that are atmost 1000 time units
long and restricting the attack timem in the time interval 1..300. The results of our analysis are:
• whenm ∈ 1..8, the attack is harmless as the system results to be safe, deadlock free and
alarm free, with probability 0.99;
• whenm ∈ 9..300, we have the following situation:
– the probability that at the attack timem the controller sends a command to activate the
cooling system (thus, triggering the attacker that will drop the command) can be obtained
by verifying the property ♢[0,m] (Cooling_on ∧ дlobal_clock ≥ m); as shown in Figure 8,
whenm grows in the time interval 1..300, the resulting probability stabilises around the
value 0.096;
– up to the m+3th time slot the system under attack remains safe, i.e., both properties
□[1,m+3] (safe) and □[1,m+3] (¬deadlock) hold with probability 0.99;
– up to them+4th time slot no alarms are fired, i.e., the property □[1,m+4] (¬alarm) holds
with probability 0.99 (no false positives);
– in them+4th time slot the system under attack might become unsafe as the probability, for
m ∈ 9..300, that the property ♢[0,m+4] (¬safe) is satisfied stabilises around the value 0.095;8
– in them+5th time slot the IDS may fire an alarm as the probability, form ∈ 9..300, that the
property ♢[0,m+5] (alarm) is satisfied stabilises around the value 0.094;9
– the system under attack may deadlock as the property ♢[0,1000] (deadlocks ) is satisfied with
probability 0.096.10
Example 2. Consider the following DoS/Integrity attack to the sensor st, of class C ∈ [I →
P (2..∞)] such that C (Est?) = {2}, C (Est!) = 2..∞ and C (ι) = ∅, for ι < {Est!, Est?}. The attack begins
is activity in the time slotm, withm > 8, and then never stops:
Am = tickm−1.A
A = ⌊sniff st (x ).if (x ≤ 10) {B⟨x⟩} else {tick.A}⌋
B (y) = ⌊forge st⟨y⟩.tick.B⟨y⟩⌋B⟨y⟩ .
Here, the attack Am behaves as follows. It sleeps form − 1 time slots and then, in the following time
slot, it sniffs the current temperature at sensor st. If the sensed temperature v is greater than 10, then it
moves to the next time slot and restarts sniffing; otherwise from that time on it will keep sending the
same temperature v to the logical components (controller and IDS). Actually, once the forgery activity
starts, the process Ctrl will always receive a temperature below 10 and will never activate the cooling
8
Since this probability coincides with that of ♢
[0,m] (Cooling_on ∧ дlobal_clock ≥ m), it appears very likely that the
activation of the cooling system in themth time slot triggers the attacker whose activity drags the system into an unsafe
state with a delay of 4 time slots.
9
As the two probabilities are pretty much the same, and □
[1,m+3] (safe) and □[1,m+4] (¬alarm) hold, the IDS seems to be
quite effective in detecting the violations of the safety conditions in them+4th time slot, with only one time slot delay.
10
Since the probabilities are still the same, we argue that when the system reaches an unsafe state then it is not able to
recover and it is doomed to deadlock.
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Fig. 8. Probability results of ♢
[0,m] (Cooling_on ∧ дlobal_clock ≥ m) by varyingm in 1..300
Fig. 9. Uppaal SMC model for the attacker Am of Example 2
system (and consequently the IDS). As a consequence, the system under attack Sys ∥ A will first move
to an unsafe state until the invariant will be violated and the system will deadlock. Indeed, in the worst
execution scenario, already in them+1th time slot the temperature may exceed 10 degrees, and after 4
tick-actions, in them+5th time slot, the system may violate the safety conditions emitting an unsafe
action. Since the temperature will keep growing without any cooling activity, the deadlock of the CPS
cannot be avoided. This is a lethal attack, as it causes a shut down of the system; it is also a stealthy
attack as it remains undetected because the IDS never gets into action.
Proposition 4. Let Sys be our running example and Am , for m > 8, be the attack defined in
Example 2. Then Sys ∥ Am ⊑m+5..∞ Sys.
Here, we verify the Uppaal SMC model of Sys in which we assume that its sensor device is
compromised (we recall that our MITM forgery attack on sensors or actuators can be assimilated
to device compromise). In particular, we replace the _Sensor_ automaton of Figure 4 with a compro-
mised one, provided in Figure 9, and implementing the malicious activities of the MITM attacker
Am of Example 2.
We have done our analysis, with a 99% accuracy, for execution traces that are at most 1000
time units long and restricting the attack timem in the integer interval 9..300. The results of our
analysis are:
• up to them+4th time slot the system under attack remains safe, deadlock free, and alarm
free, i.e., all three properties □[1,m+4] (safe), □[1,m+4] (¬deadlock), and □[1,m+4] (¬alarm) hold
with probability 0.99;
• in them+5th time slot the system under attack might become unsafe as the probability, for
m ∈ 9..300, that the property ♢[0,m+5] (¬safe) is satisfied stabilises around 0.104;
• the system under attack will eventually deadlock not later that 80 time slots after the attack
timem, as the property □[m+80,1000] (deadlocks ) is satisfied with probability 0.99;
• finally, the attack is stealthy as the property □[1,1000] (¬alarm) holds with probability 0.99.
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Fig. 10. Uppaal SMC model for the attacker An of Example 3
Now, let us examine a similar but less severe attack.
Example 3. Consider the following DoS/Integrity attack to sensor st, of class C ∈ [I → P (1..n)],
with C (Est!) = C (Est?) = 1..n and C (ι) = ∅, for ι < {Est!, Est?}:
An = ⌊sniff st (x ).⌊forge st⟨x−4⟩.tick.An−1⌋An−1⌋An−1, for n > 0
A0 = nil .
In this attack, for n consecutive time slots, An sends to the logical components (controller and IDS)
the current sensed temperature decreased by an offset 4. The effect of this attack on the system depends
on the duration n of the attack itself: (i) for n ≤ 8, the attack is harmless as the variable temp may not
reach a (critical) temperature above 9.9; (ii) for n = 9, the variable temp might reach a temperature
above 9.9 in the 9th time slot, and the attack would delay the activation of the cooling system of one
time slot; as a consequence, the system might get into an unsafe state in the time interval 14..15, but
no alarm will be fired; (iii) for n ≥ 10, the system may get into an unsafe state in the time slot 14 and
in the following n + 11 time slots; in this case, this would not be stealthy attack as the IDS will fire the
alarm with a delay of at most two time slots later, rather this is a temporary attack that ends in the
time slot n + 11.
Proposition 5. Let Sys be our running example and An be the attack defined in Example 3. Then:
• Sys ∥ An ⊑ Sys, for n ≤ 8,
• Sys ∥ An ⊑14..15 Sys, for n = 9,
• Sys ∥ An ⊑14..n+11 Sys, for n ≥ 10.
Here, we verify the Uppaal SMC model of Sys in which we replace the _Proxy_Sensor_ automaton
of Figure 5 with a compromised one, provided in Figure 10, and implementing the MITM activities
of the attacker An of Example 3.
We have done our analysis, with a 99% accuracy, for execution traces that are at most 1000 time
units long, and assuming that the duration of the attack n may vary in the integer interval 1..300.
The results of our analysis are:
• whenn ∈ 1..8, the system under attack remains safe, deadlock free, and alarm free, i.e., all three
properties □[1,1000] (safe), □[1,1000] (¬deadlock), and □[1,1000] (¬alarm) hold with probability
0.99;
• when n = 9, we have the following situation:
– the system under attack is deadlock free, i.e., the property □[1,1000] (¬deadlock) holds with
probability 0.99;
– the system remains safe and alarm free, except for the time interval 14..15, i.e., all the
following properties □[1,13] (safe), □[1,13] (¬alarm), □[16,1000] (safe), and □[16,1000] (¬alarm)
hold with probability 0.99;
– in the time interval 14..15, we may have violations of safety conditions, as the property
♢[0,14] (¬safe ∧ дlobal_clock ≥ 14) is satisfied with a probability 0.62, while the property
♢[0,15] (¬safe ∧ дlobal_clock ≥ 15) is satisfied with probability 0.21; both violations are
stealthy as the property □[14,15] (¬alarm) holds with probability 0.99;
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• when n ≥ 10, we have the following situation:
– the system is deadlock free, i.e., the property□
[1,1000] (¬deadlock) holds with probability 0.99;
– the system remains safe except for the time interval 14..n+11, i.e., the two properties
□[1,13] (safe) and □[n+12,1000] (safe) hold with probability 0.99;
– the system is alarm free except for the time interval n+1..n+11, i.e., the two properties
□[0,n] (¬alarm) and □[n+12,1000] (¬alarm) hold with probability 0.99;
– in the 14th time slot the system under attack may reach an unsafe state as the probability,
for n ∈ 10..300, that the property ♢[0,14] (¬safe ∧ дlobal_clock ≥ 14) is satisfied stabilises
around 0.548;
– once the attack has terminated, in the time interval n+1..n+11, the system under attack has
good chances to reach an unsafe state as the probability, for n ∈ 10..300, that the property
♢[0,n+11] (¬safe ∧ n+1 ≤ дlobal_clock ≤ n+11) is satisfied stabilises around 0.672;
– the violations of the safety conditions remain completely stealthy only up to the duration n
of the attack (we recall that□[0,n] (¬alarm) is satisfied with probability 0.99); the probability,
for n ∈ 10..300, that the property ♢[0,n+11] (alarm) is satisfied stabilises around 0.13; thus,
in the time interval n+1..n+11, only a small portion of violations of safety conditions are
detected by the IDS while a great majority of them remains stealthy.
4.2 A technique for proving attack tolerance/vulnerability
In this subsection, we provide sufficient criteria to prove attack tolerance/vulnerability to attacks of
an arbitrary class C . Actually, we do more than that: we provide sufficient criteria to prove attack
tolerance/vulnerability to all attacks of any class C ′ that is somehow “weaker” than a given class C .
Definition 14. Let Ci ∈ [I → P (mi ..ni )], for i ∈ {1, 2}, be two classes of attacks, withm1..n1 ⊆
m2..n2. We say that C1 is weaker than C2, written C1 ⪯ C2, if C1 (ι) ⊆ C2 (ι) for any ι ∈ I.
Intuitively, if C1 ⪯ C2 then: (i) the attacks of class C1 might achieve fewer malicious activities
than any attack of class C2 (formally, there may be ι ∈ I such that C1 (ι) = ∅ and C2 (ι) , ∅); (ii) for
those malicious activities ι ∈ I achieved by the attacks of both classesC1 andC2 (i.e.,C1 (ι) , ∅ and
C2 (ι) , ∅), if they may be perpetrated by the attacks of class C1 at some time slot k ∈m1..n1 (i.e.,
k ∈ C1 (ι)) then all attacks of class C2 may do the same activity ι at the same time k (i.e., k ∈ C2 (ι)).
The next objective is to define a notion ofmost powerful attack (also called top attacker) of a given
classC , such that, if a CPSM tolerates the most powerful attack of classC then it also tolerates any
attack of class C ′, with C ′ ⪯ C . We will provide a similar condition for attack vulnerability: letM
be a CPS vulnerable to Top(C ) in the time intervalm1..n1; then, for any attack A of class C ′, with
C ′ ⪯ C , ifM is vulnerable to A then it is so for a smaller time intervalm2..n2 ⊆ m1..n1.
Our notion of top attacker has two extra ingredients with respect to the physics-based attacks
seen up to now: (i) nondeterminism, and (ii) time-unguarded recursive processes. This extra power
of the top attacker is not a problem as we are looking for sufficient criteria.
For what concerns nondeterminism, we assume a generic procedure rnd () that given an arbitrary
setZ returns an element ofZ chosen in a nondeterministic manner. This procedure allows us to ex-
press nondeterministic choice, P⊕Q , as an abbreviation for the process if (rnd ({true, false})) {P }else{Q }.
Thus, let ι ∈ {Ep? : p ∈ S ∪ A} ∪ {Ep! : p ∈ S ∪ A},m ∈ N+, n ∈ N+ ∪ {∞}, withm ≤ n, and
T ⊆ m..n, we define the attack process Att (ι,k,T )11 as the attack which may achieve the mali-
cious activity ι, at the time slot k , and which tries to do the same in all subsequent time slots of T .
11
In case of sensor sniffing, we might avoid to add this specific attack process as our top attacker process can forge any
possible value without need to read sensors.
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Fig. 11. Uppaal SMC model for the top attacker Top(Cm ) of Example 4
Formally,
Att (Ea?,k,T ) = if (k ∈ T ) {(⌊dropa(x ).Att (Ea?,k,T )⌋Att (Ea?,k+1,T )) ⊕ tick.Att (Ea?,k+1,T )}
else {if (k < sup(T )) {tick.Att (Ea?,k+1,T )} else {nil}}
Att (Es?,k,T ) = if (k ∈ T ) {(⌊sniff s (x ).Att (Es?,k,T )⌋Att (Es?,k+1,T )) ⊕ tick.Att (Es?,k+1,T )}
else {if (k < sup(T )) {tick.Att (Es?,k+1,T )} else {nil}}
Att (Ep!,k,T ) = if (k ∈ T ) {(⌊forgep⟨rnd (R)⟩.Att (Ep!,k,T )⌋Att (Ep!,k+1,T )) ⊕ tick.Att (Ep!,k+1,T )}
else {if (k < sup(T )) {tick.Att (Ep!,k+1,T )} else {nil}} .
Note that, for T = ∅, we assume sup(T ) = −∞. We can now use the definition above to formalise
the notion of most powerful attack of a given class C .




Att (ι, 1,C (ι))
as the most powerful attack, or top attacker, of class C .
The following theorem provides soundness criteria for attack tolerance and attack vulnerability.
Theorem 3 (Soundness criteria). Let M be an honest and sound CPS, C an arbitrary class of
attacks, and A an attack of a class C ′, with C ′ ⪯ C .
• IfM ∥ Top(C ) ⊑ M thenM ∥ A ⊑ M .
• IfM ∥ Top(C ) ⊑m1 ..n1 M then eitherM ∥ A ⊑ M orM ∥ A ⊑m2 ..n2 M , withm2..n2 ⊆ m1..n1.
Corollary 1. LetM be an honest and sound CPS, and C a class of attacks. If Top(C ) is not lethal
for M then any attack A of class C ′, with C ′ ⪯ C , is not lethal for M . If Top(C ) is not a permanent
attack forM , then any attack A of class C ′, with C ′ ⪯ C , is not a permanent attack forM .
The following example illustrates howTheorem 3 could be used to infer attack tolerance/vulnerability
with respect to an entire class of attacks.
Example 4. Consider our running example Sys and a class of attacks Cm , form ∈ N, such that
Cm (Ecool?) = Cm (Ecool !) = {m} and Cm (ι) = ∅, for ι < {Ecool?, Ecool !}. Attacks of class Cm may
tamper with the actuator cool only in the time slotm (i.e., in the time intervalm..m). The attack Am
of Example 1 is of class Cm .
In the following analysis in Uppaal SMC of the top attacker Top(Cm ), we will show that both the
vulnerability window and the probability of successfully attacking the system represent an upper
bound for the attack Am of Example 1 of class Cm . Technically, we verify the Uppaal SMC model
of Sys in which we replace the _Proxy_Actuator_ automaton of Figure 5 with a compromised one,
provided in Figure 11, and implementing the activities of the top attacker Top(Cm ). We carry out
our analysis with a 99% accuracy, for execution traces that are at most 1000 time slots long, limiting
the attack timem to the integer interval 1..300.
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Fig. 12. Results of ♢
[0,m+3] (deadlock ∧ global_clock ≥ m + 1) by varying the attack timem
Fig. 13. Results of ♢
[0,1000] (deadlock ∧ global_clock ≥ m + 4) by varying the attack timem
To explain our analysis further, let us provide details on how Top(Cm ) affects Sys when compared
to the attacker Am of class Cm seen in the Example 1.
• In the time interval 1..m, the attacked system remains safe, deadlock free, and alarm free.
Formally, the three properties□[1,m] (safe),□[1,m] (¬deadlock) and□[1,m] (¬alarm) hold with
probability 0.99. Thus, in this time interval, the top attacker is harmless, as well as Am .
• In the time intervalm+1..m+3, the system exposed to the top attackermay deadlockwhenm ∈
1..8; form > 8 the system under attack is deadlock free (see Figure 12). This is because the top
attacker, unlike the attacker Am , can forge in the first 8 time slots cool-on commands turning
on the cooling and dropping the temperature below zero in the time intervalm+1..m+3. Note
that no alarms or unsafe behaviours occur in this case, as neither the safety process nor the
IDS check whether the temperature drops below a certain threshold. Formally, the properties
□[m+1,m+3] (safe) and □[m+1,m+3] (¬alarm) hold with probability 0.99, as already seen for the
attacker Am .
• In the time intervalm+4..1000, the top attacker has better chances to deadlock the system
when compared with the attacker Am (see Figure 13). For what concerns safety and alarms,
the top attacker and the attacker Am have the same probability of success (the properties
□[m+4,1000] (safe) and □[m+4,1000] (¬alarm) return the same probability results).
This example shows how the verification of a top attacker Top(C ) provides an upper bound
of the effectiveness of the entire class of attacks C , in terms of both vulnerability window and
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probability of successfully attack the system. Of course, the accuracy of such approximation cannot
be estimated a priori.
5 IMPACT OF AN ATTACK
In the previous section, we have grouped physics-based attacks by focussing on the physical
devices under attack and the timing aspects of the attack (Definition 12). Then, we have provided a
formalisation of when a CPS should be considered tolerant/vulnerable to an attack (Definition 13).
In this section, we show that these two formalisations are important not only to demonstrate
the tolerance (or vulnerability) of a CPS with respect to certain attacks, but also to evaluate the
disruptive impact of those attacks on the target CPS [22, 44].
The goal of this section is to provide a formal metric to estimate the impact of a successful attack
on the physical behaviour of a CPS. In particular, we focus on the ability that an attack may have to
drag a CPS out of the correct behaviour modelled by its evolution map, with the given uncertainty.
Recall that evol is monotone with respect to the uncertainty. Thus, as stated in Proposition 6, an
increase of the uncertainty may translate into a widening of the range of the possible behaviours
of the CPS. In the following, given the physical environment E = ⟨evol,meas, inv, safe, ξw, ξe⟩, we
write E[ξw ← ξ
′
w
] as an abbreviation for ⟨evol,meas, inv, safe, ξ ′
w
, ξe⟩; similarly, for M = E; S Z P
we writeM[ξw ← ξ
′
w
] for E[ξw ← ξ
′
w
]; S Z P .






−−−→ M ′ thenM[ξw ← ξ ′w]
t




However, a wider uncertainty in the model does not always correspond to a widening of the
possible behaviours of the CPS. In fact, this depends on the intrinsic tolerance of a CPS with respect
to changes in the uncertainty function. In the following, we will write ξw+ξ
′
w
to denote the function
ξ ′′
w
∈ RX such that ξ ′′
w
(x ) = ξw (x ) + ξ
′
w
(x ), for any x ∈ X.
Definition 16 (System ξ -tolerance). An honest and sound CPSM with uncertainty ξw is said
ξ -tolerant, for ξ ∈ RX and ξ ≥ 0, if
ξ = sup
{
ξ ′ : M[ξw ← ξw + η] ⊑ M, for any 0 ≤ η ≤ ξ ′
}
.
Intuitively, if a CPSM has been designed with a given uncertainty ξw, butM is actually ξ -tolerant,
with ξ > 0, then the uncertainty ξw is somehow underestimated: the real uncertainty ofM is given
by ξw + ξ . This information is quite important when trying to estimate the impact of an attack
on a CPS. In fact, if a systemM has been designed with a given uncertainty ξw, butM is actually
ξ -tolerant, with ξ > 0, then an attack has (at least) a “room for manoeuvre” ξ to degrade the whole
CPS without being observed (and hence detected).
Let Sys be our running example. In the rest of the section, with an abuse of notation, we will write
Sys[δ ← γ ] to denote Sys where the uncertainty δ of the variable temp has been replaced with γ .















, then this statement relies on the following proposition whose proof
can be found in the associated technical report [39].
Proposition 7. We have





• Sys[δ ← γ ] @ Sys, for γ > 9
20
.
Now everything is in place to define our metric to estimate the impact of an attack.
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Definition 17 (Impact). LetM be an honest and sound CPS with uncertainty ξw. We say that an
attack A has definitive impact ξ on the systemM if
ξ = inf
{





It has pointwise impact ξ on the systemM at timem if
ξ= inf
{
ξ ′ : ξ ′ ∈ RX ∧ ξ ′>0 ∧ M ∥ A ⊑m ..n M[ξw ← ξw + ξ
′
],n ∈ N+ ∪ {∞}
}
.
Intuitively, the impact of an attacker A on a systemM measures the perturbation introduced by
the presence of the attacker in the compound system M ∥ A with respect to the original system
M . With this definition, we can establish either the definitive (and hence maximum) impact of the
attack A on the system M , or the impact at a specific timem. In the latter case, by definition of
⊑m ..n , there are two possibilities: either the impact of the attack keeps growing after timem, or in
the time intervalm+1, the system under attack deadlocks.
The impact of Top(C ) provides an upper bound for the impact of all attacks of class C ′, C ′ ⪯ C ,
as shown in the following theorem (proved in the appendix).
Theorem 4 (Top attacker’s impact). Let M be an honest and sound CPS, and C an arbitrary
class of attacks. Let A be an arbitrary attack of class C ′, with C ′ ⪯ C .
• The definitive impact of Top(C ) onM is greater than or equal to the definitive impact of A onM .
• If Top(C ) has pointwise impact ξ onM at timem, and A has pointwise impact ξ ′ onM at time
m′, withm′ ≤ m, then ξ ′ ≤ ξ .
In order to help the intuition on the impact metric defined in Definition 17, we give a couple of
examples. Here, we focus on the role played by the size of the vulnerability window.
Example 6. Let us consider the attack An of Example 3, for n ∈ {8, 9, 10}. Then,
• A8 has definitive impact 0 on Sys,
• A9 has definitive impact 0.23 on Sys,
• A10 has definitive impact 0.4 on Sys.
Formally, the impacts of these three attacks are obtained by calculating
inf {ξ ′ : ξ ′ > 0 ∧ Sys ∥ An ⊑ Sys[δ ← δ + ξ ′]} ,
for n ∈ {8, 9, 10}. Attack A9 has a very low impact on Sys as it may drag the system into a temporary
unsafe state in the time interval 14..15, whereas A10 has a slightly stronger impact as it may induce a
temporary unsafe state during the larger time interval 14..21. Technically, since δ +ξ = 0.4+0.4 = 0.8,
the calculation of the impact of A10 relies on the following proposition whose proof can be found in the
associated technical report [39].
Proposition 8. Let A10 be the attack defined in Example 3. Then:
• Sys ∥ A10 @ Sys[δ ← γ ], for γ ∈ (0.4, 0.8),
• Sys ∥ A10 ⊑ Sys[δ ← γ ], for γ > 0.8.
On the other hand, the attack provided in Example 2, driving the system to a (permanent) deadlock
state, has a much stronger impact on the CPS Sys than the attack of Example 3.
Example 7. Let us consider the attack Am of Example 2, form > 8. As already discussed, this is a
stealthy lethal attack that has a very severe and high impact. In fact, it has a definitive impact of 8.5
on the CPS Sys. Formally,
8.5 = inf
{
ξ ′ : ξ ′ > 0 ∧ Sys ∥ Am ⊑ Sys[δ ← δ + ξ ′]
}
.
Technically, since δ +ξ = 0.4+8.5 = 8.9, what stated in this example relies on the following proposition
whose proof can be found in the associated technical report [39].


















































A Formal Approach to Physics-Based Attacks in Cyber-Physical Systems 0:27
Proposition 9. Let Am be the attack defined in Example 2. Then:
• Sys ∥ Am @ Sys[δ ← γ ], for γ ∈ (0.4, 8.9),
• Sys ∥ Am ⊑ Sys[δ ← γ ], for γ > 8.9.
Thus, Definition 17 provides an instrument to estimate the impact of a successful attack on a CPS
in terms of the perturbation introduced both on its physical and on its logical processes. However,
there is at least another question that a CPS designer could ask: “Is there a way to estimate the
chances that an attack will be successful during the execution of my CPS?” To paraphrase in a
more operational manner: how many execution traces of my CPS are prone to be attacked by a
specific attack? As argued in the future work, we believe that probabilistic metrics might reveal to
be very useful in this respect [41].
6 CONCLUSIONS, RELATED AND FUTUREWORK
6.1 Summary
We have provided theoretical foundations to reason about and formally detect attacks to physical
devices of CPSs. A straightforward utilisation of these methodologies is for model-checking or
monitoring in order to be able to formally analyse security properties of CPSs either before system
deployment or, when static analysis is not feasible, at runtime to promptly detect undesired
behaviours. To that end, we have proposed a hybrid process calculus, called CCPSA, as a formal
specification language to model physical and cyber components of CPSs as well as MITM physics-
based attacks. Note that our calculus is general enough to represent Supervisory Control And Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems as cyber components which can easily interact with controllers
and IDSs via channel communications. SCADA systems are the main technology used by system
engineers to supervise the activities of complex CPSs.
Based on CCPSA and its labelled transition semantics, we have formalised a threat model for CPSs
by grouping physics-based attacks in classes, according to the target physical devices and two timing
parameters: begin and duration of the attacks. Then, we developed two different compositional
trace semantics for CCPSA to assess attack tolerance/vulnerability with respect to a given attack.
Such a tolerance may hold ad infinitum or for a limited amount of time. In the latter case, the CPS
under attack is vulnerable and the attack affects the observable behaviour of the system only after
a certain point in time, when the attack itself may already be achieved or still working.
Along the lines of GNDC [18], we have defined a notion of top attacker, Top(C ), of a given class of
attacks C , which has been used to provide sufficient criteria to prove attack tolerance/vulnerability
to all attacks of class C (and weaker ones).
Then, we have provided a metric to estimate themaximum impact introduced in the system under
attack with respect to its genuine behaviour, according to its evolution law and the uncertainty
of the model. We have proved that the impact of the most powerful attack Top(C ) represents an
upper bound for the impact of any attack A of class C (and weaker ones).
Finally, we have formalised a running example in Uppaal SMC [16], the statistical extension of
the Uppaal model checker [7]. Our goal was to test Uppaal SMC as an automatic tool for the static
security analysis of a simple but significant CPS exposed to a number of different physics-based
attacks with different impacts on the system under attack. Here, it is important to note that, although
we have verified most of the properties stated in the paper, we have not been able to capture time
properties on the responsiveness of the IDS to violations of the safety conditions. Examples of such
properties are: (i) there are time slotsm and k such that the system may have an unsafe state at
some time n > m, and the IDS detects this violation with a delay of at least k time slots (k being a
lower bound of the reaction time of the IDS), or (ii) there is a time slot n in which the IDS fires an
alarm but neither an unsafe state nor a deadlock occurs in the time interval n−k ..n+k : this would
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provide a tolerance of the occurrence of false positive. Furthermore, Uppaal SMC does not support
the verification of nested formulae. Thus, although from a designer’s point of view it would have
been much more practical to verify a logic formula of the form ∃♢(□[t,t+5]temp > 9.9) to check
safety and invariant conditions, in Uppaal SMC we had to implement a _Safety_ automaton that is
not really part of our CPS (for more details see the discussion of related work).
6.2 Related work
A number of approaches have been proposed for modelling CPSs using hybrid process algebras [8,
15, 21, 52, 56]. Among these approaches, our calculus CCPSA shares some similarities with the
ϕ-calculus [52]. However, unlike CCPSA, in the ϕ-calculus, given a hybrid system (E, P ), the process
P can dynamically change the evolution law in E. Furthermore, the ϕ-calculus does not have a
representation of physical devices and measurement law, which are instead crucial for us to model
physics-based attacks that operate in a timely fashion on sensors and actuators. More recently,
Galpin et al. [21] have proposed a process algebra in which the continuous part of the system
is represented by appropriate variables whose changes are determined by active influences (i.e.,
commands on actuators).
Many good surveys on the security of cyber-physical systems have been published recently
(see, e.g., [3, 24, 61, 62]), including a survey of surveys [23]. In particular, the surveys [61, 62]
provide a systematic categorisation of 138 selected papers on CPS security. Among those 138
papers, 65 adopt a discrete notion of time similar to ours, 26 a continuous one, 55 a quasi-static
time model, and the rest use a hybrid time model. This study encouraged us in adopting a discrete
time model for physical processes rather than a continuous one. Still, one might wonder what is
actually lost when one adopts a discrete rather than a continuous time model, in particular when
the attacker has the possibility to move in a continuous time setting. A continuous time model
is, of course, more expressive; for instance, Kanovich et al. [33] identified a novel vulnerability in
the context of cryptographic protocols for CPSs in which the attacker works in a continuous-time
setting to fool discrete-time verifiers. However, we believe that, for physics-based attacks, little is
lost by adopting a discrete time model. In fact, sensor measurements and actuator commands are
elaborated within controllers, which are digital devices with an intrinsic discrete notion of time. In
particular, for what concerns dropping of actuator commands and forging of sensor measurements,
there are no differences between discrete-time and continuous-time attackers given that to achieve
those malicious activities the attacker has to synchronise with the controller. Thus, there remain
only two potential malicious activities: sensor sniffing and forging of actuator commands. Can a
continuous-time attacker, able to carry out these two malicious activities, be more disruptive than
a similar attacker adopting a discrete-time model? This would only be the case when dealing with
very rare physical processes changing their physical state in an extremely fast way, faster than
the controller which is the one dictating the discrete time of the CPS. However, we believe that
CPSs of this kind would hardly be controllable as they would pose serious safety issues even in the
absence of any attacker.
The survey [24] provides an exhaustive review of papers on physics-based anomaly detection
proposing a unified taxonomy, whereas the survey [3] presents the main solutions in the estimation
of the consequences of cyber-attacks, attacks modelling and detection, and the development of
security architecture (the main types of attacks and threats against CPSs are analysed and grouped
in a tree structure).
Huang et al. [31] were among the first to propose threat models for CPSs. Along with [34, 35],
they stressed the role played by timing parameters on integrity and DoS attacks.
Gollmann et al. [25] discussed possible goals (equipment damage, production damage, compliance
violation) and stages (access, discovery, control, damage, cleanup) of physics-based attacks. In this


















































A Formal Approach to Physics-Based Attacks in Cyber-Physical Systems 0:29
article, we focused on the “damage” stage, where the attacker already has a rough idea of the
plant and the control architecture of the target CPS. As we remarked in Section 1, we here focus
on an attacker who has already entered the CPS, without considering how the attacker gained
access to the system, which could have happened in several ways, for instance by attacking an
Internet-accessible controller or one of the communication protocols.
Almost all papers discussed in the surveys mentioned above [3, 24, 62] investigate attacks on
CPSs and their protection by relying on simulation test systems to validate the results, rather than
formal methodologies. We are aware of a number of works applying formal methods to CPS security,
although they apply methods, and most of the time have goals, that are quite different from ours.
We discuss the most significant ones on the following.
Burmester et al. [12] employed hybrid timed automata to give a threat framework based on the
traditional Byzantine faults model for crypto-security. However, as remarked in [54], physics-based
attacks and faults have inherently distinct characteristics. Faults are considered as physical events
that affect the system behaviour where simultaneous events don’t act in a coordinated way, whereas
cyber attacks may be performed over a significant number of attack points and in a coordinated way.
In [58], Vigo presented an attack scenario that addresses some of the peculiarities of a cyber-
physical adversary, and discussed how this scenario relates to other attack models popular in the
security protocol literature. Then, in [59] Vigo et al. proposed an untimed calculus of broadcasting
processes equipped with notions of failed and unwanted communication. These works differ quite
considerably from ours, e.g., they focus on DoS attacks without taking into consideration timing
aspects or impact of the attack.
Cómbita et al. [14] and Zhu and Basar [63] applied game theory to capture the conflict of goals
between an attacker who seeks to maximise the damage inflicted to a CPS’s security and a defender
who aims to minimise it [43].
Rocchetto and Tippenhaur [51] introduced a taxonomy of the diverse attacker models proposed
for CPS security and outline requirements for generalised attacker models; in [50], they then
proposed an extended Dolev-Yao attacker model suitable for CPSs. In their approach, physical layer
interactions are modelled as abstract interactions between logical components to support reasoning
on the physical-layer security of CPSs. This is done by introducing additional orthogonal channels.
Time is not represented.
Nigam et al. [46] worked around the notion of Timed Dolev-Yao Intruder Models for Cyber-Physical
Security Protocols by bounding the number of intruders required for the automated verification of
such protocols. Following a tradition in security protocol analysis, they provide an answer to the
question: How many intruders are enough for verification and where should they be placed? They
also extend the strand space model to CPS protocols by allowing for the symbolic representation of
time, so that they can use the tool Maude [47] along with SMT support. Their notion of time is
however different from ours, as they focus on the time a message needs to travel from an agent to
another. The paper does not mention physical devices, such as sensors and/or actuators.
There are a few approaches that carry out information flow security analysis on discrete/continuous
models for CPSs. Akella et al. [2] proposed an approach to perform information flow analysis,
including both trace-based analysis and automated analysis through process algebra specification.
This approach has been used to verify process algebra models of a gas pipeline system and a smart
electric power grid system. Bodei et al. [10] proposed a process calculus supporting a control flow
analysis that safely approximates the abstract behaviour of IoT systems. Essentially, they track
how data spread from sensors to the logics of the network, and how physical data are manipulated.
In [9], the same authors extend their work to infer quantitative measures to establish the cost of
possibly security countermeasures, in terms of time and energy. Another discrete model has been
proposed by Wang [60], where Petri-net models have been used to verify non-deducibility security
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properties of a natural gas pipeline system. More recently, Bohrer and Platzer [11] introduced dHL,
a hybrid logic for verifying cyber-physical hybrid-dynamic information flows, communicating
information through both discrete computation and physical dynamics, so security is ensured even
when attackers observe continuously-changing values in continuous time.
Huang et al. [30] proposed a risk assessment method that uses a Bayesian network to model the
attack propagation process and infers the probabilities of sensors and actuators to be compromised.
These probabilities are fed into a stochastic hybrid system (SHS) model to predict the evolution of
the physical process being controlled. Then, the security risk is quantified by evaluating the system
availability with the SHS model.
As regards tools for the formal verification of CPSs, we remark that we tried to verify our case
study using model-checking tools for distributed systems such as PRISM [37], Uppaal [6], Real-Time
Maude [47], and prohver within the MODEST TOOLSET [27]. In particular, as our example adopts a
discrete notion of time, we started looking at tools supporting discrete time. PRISM, for instance,
relies on Markov decision processes or discrete-time Markov chains, depending on whether one is
interested in modelling nondeterminism or not. It supports the verification of both CTL and LTL
properties (when dealing with nonprobabilistic systems). This allowed us to express the formula
∃♢(□[t,t+5]temp > 9.9) to verify violations of the safety conditions, avoiding the implementation
of the _Safety_ automaton. However, using integer variables to represent state variables with a
fixed precision requires the introduction of extra transitions (to deal with nondeterministic errors),
which significantly complicates the PRISM model. In this respect, Uppaal appears to be more
efficient than PRISM, as we have been able to concisely express the error occurring in integer
state variables thanks to the select() construct, in which the user can fix the granularity adopted to
approximate a dense interval. This discrete representation provides an under-approximation of the
system behaviour; thus, a finer granularity translates into an exponential increase of the complexity
of the system, with obvious consequences on the verification performance. Then, we tried to model
our case study in Real-Time Maude, a completely different framework for real-time systems, based
on rewriting logic. The language supports object-like inheritance features that are quite helpful to
represent complex systems in a modular manner. We use communication channels to implement our
attacks on the physical devices. Furthermore, we used rational variables for a more concise discrete
representation of state variables. We have been able to verify LTL and T-CTL properties, although
the verification process resulted to be quite slow due to a proliferation of rewriting rules when fixing
a reasonable granularity to approximate dense intervals. As the verification logic is quite powerful,
there is no need to implement an ad-hoc process to check for safety. Finally, we also tried to model
our case study in the safety model checker prohverwithin theMODEST TOOLSET. We specified our case
study in the high-level languageHMODEST, supporting: (i) differential inclusion to model linear CPSs
with constant bounded derivatives; (ii) linear formulae to express nondeterministic assignments
within a dense interval; (iii) a compositional programming style inherited from process algebra;
(iv) shared actions to synchronise parallel components. However, we faced the same performance
limitations encountered in Uppaal. Thus, we decided to move to statistical model checking.
Finally, this article extends the preliminary conference version [40] in the following aspects: (i) the
calculus has been slightly redesigned by distinguishing physical state and physical environment,
adding specifying constructs to sniff, drop and forge packets, and removing, for simplicity, protected
physical devices; (ii) the two trace semantics have been proven to be compositional, i.e., preserved
by properly defined contexts; (iii) both our running example Sys and the attacks proposed in
Examples 1, 2, 3 and 4 have been implemented and verified in Uppaal SMC.
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6.3 Future work
While much is still to be done, we believe that our paper provides a stepping stone for the develop-
ment of formal and automated tools to analyse the security of CPSs. We will consider applying,
possibly after proper enhancements, existing tools and frameworks for automated security protocol
analysis, resorting to the development of a dedicated tool if existing ones prove not up to the
task. We will also consider further security properties and concrete examples of CPSs, as well
as other kinds of physics-based attacks, such as delays in the communication of measurements
and/or commands, and periodic attacks, i.e., attacks that operate in a periodic fashion inducing
periodic physical effects on the targeted system that may be easily confused by engineers with
system malfunctions. This will allow us to refine the classes of attacks we have given here (e.g., by
formalising a type system amenable to static analysis), and provide a formal definition of when
a CPS is more secure than another so as to be able to design, by progressive refinement, secure
variants of a vulnerable CPSs.
We also aim to extend the behavioural theory of CCPSA by developing suitable probabilistic
metrics to take into consideration the probability of a specific trace to actually occur. We have
already done some progress in this direction for a variant of CCPSA with no security features in
it, by defining ad hoc compositional bisimulation metrics [42]. In this manner, we believe that our
notion of impact might be refined by taking into account quantitative aspects of an attack such
as the probability of being successful when targeting a specific CPS. A first attempt on a (much)
simpler IoT setting can be found in [41].
Finally, for what concerns automatic approximations of the impact, while we have not yet fully
investigated the problem, we believe that we can transform it into a “minimum problem”. For
instance, if the environment uses linear functions, then, by adapting techniques developed for
linear hybrid automata (see, e.g., [4]), the set of all traces with length at most n (for a fixed n) can
be characterised by a system of first degree inequalities, so the measure of the impact could be
translated into a linear programming problem.
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A PROOFS
As already stated in Remark 2, our trace preorder ⊑ is deadlock-sensitive. Formally,
Lemma 1. Let M and N be two CPSs in CCPSA such that M ⊑ N . Then, M satisfies its system
invariant if and only if N satisfies its system invariant.
Proof. This is because CPSs that don’t satisfy their invariant can only fire deadlock actions. □
Proof of Theorem 1. We prove the three statements separately.
(1) Let us prove thatM ⊎O
t
−−−→ M ′ ⊎O ′ entails N ⊎O
t̂
===⇒ N ′ ⊎O ′. The proof is by induction
on the length of the traceM ⊎O
t
−−−→ M ′ ⊎O ′.
As M ⊑ N , by an application of Lemma 1 it follows that either both M and N satisfy their
respective invariants or they both don’t. In the latter case, the result would be easy to prove
as the systems can only fire deadlock actions. Similarly, if the system invariant of O is not
satisfied, thenM⊎O and N ⊎O can perform only deadlock actions and again the result would
follow easily. Thus, let us suppose that the system invariants ofM , N and O are satisfied.
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Base case.We supposeM = E1; S1 Z P1, N = E2; S2 Z P2, and O = E3; S3 Z P3. We proceed by
case analysis on whyM ⊎O
α
−−−→ M ′ ⊎O ′, for some action α .
• α = cv . SupposeM ⊎O
cv
−−−−→ M ′ ⊎O ′ is derived by an application of rule (Out). We have
two possible cases:
– either P1 ∥ P3
cv







, for some P ′
3
,O ′ = S3 Z P
′
3
, andM ′ = M ,








, for some P ′
1
, andM = S1 Z P
′
1
and O ′ = O .
In the first case, by an application of rule (Par) we derive P2 ∥ P3
cv




system invariants of N and O are satisfied, we can derive the required trace N ⊎O
cv
−−−−→





of M is satisfied, by an application of rule (Out) we can derive M
cv
−−−−→ M ′. As M ⊑ N ,
there exists a trace N
ĉv
====⇒ N ′, for some system N ′. Thus, by several applications of rule
(Par) we can easily derive N ⊎O
ĉv
====⇒ N ′ ⊎O = N ′ ⊎O ′, as required.
• α = cv . SupposeM ⊎O
cv
−−−−→ M ′ ⊎O ′ is derived by an application of rule (Inp). This case
is similar to the previous one.
• α = τ . Suppose M ⊎ O
τ
−−−→ M ′ ⊎ O ′ is derived by an application of rule (SensRead). We
have two possible cases:
– either P1 ∥ P3
s?v







, for some P ′
3

















, for some P ′
1





−−−−−−↛ ) andM ′ = S1 Z P
′
1
and O ′ = O .
In the first case, by an application of rule (Par) we derive P2 ∥ P3
s?v






−−−−−−↛ and since the sets of sensors are always disjoint, we can derive P2 ∥
P3
Es !v
−−−−−−↛ . Since both invariants of N andO are satisfied, we can derive N ⊎O
τ
−−−→ N ⊎O ′





the invariant ofM is satisfied, by an application of rule (SensRead) we can deriveM
τ
−−−→ M ′
withM ′ = S1 Z P
′
1
. AsM ⊑ N , there exists a derivation N
τ̂
===⇒ N ′, for some N ′. Thus, we
can derive the required trace N ⊎O
τ̂
===⇒ N ′ ⊎O by an application of rule (Par).
• α = τ . Suppose thatM ⊎O
τ
−−−→ M ′ ⊎O ′ is derived by an application of rule (ESensSniff E).
This case is similar to the previous one.
• α = τ . Suppose that M ⊎ O
τ
−−−→ M ′ ⊎ O ′ is derived by an application of rule (ActWrite).
This case is similar to the case (SensRead).
• α = τ . Suppose thatM ⊎O
τ
−−−→ M ′ ⊎O ′ is derived by an application of rule (EAcIntegr E).
This case is similar to the case (ESensSniff E).
• α = τ . Suppose thatM ⊎O
τ
−−−→ M ′ ⊎O ′ is derived by an application of rule (Tau). We have
four possible cases:




























prove the first case, the second one is similar. As the invariant of M is satisfied, by an
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application of rule (Out) we can derive M
cv
















, by several applications
of rule (Par) and one of rule (Com) we derive N ⊎O
ĉv
====⇒ N ′ ⊎O ′, as required.
– P1 ∥ P3
τ
−−−→ P1 ∥ P
′
3




∥ P3 by an application of (Par). This case is easy.






by an application of either rule (EActDrop E) or rule (ESensIntegr E).
This case does not apply as the sets of actuators ofM and O are disjoint.






by the application of on rule among (Res), (Rec), (Then) and (Else).
This case does not apply to parallel processes.
• α = deadlock. Suppose thatM ⊎O
deadlock
−−−−−−−−−→ M ′ ⊎O ′ is derived by an application of rule
(Deadlock). This case is not admissible as the invariants ofM , N and O are satisfied.
• α = tick. Suppose thatM⊎O
tick
−−−−−→ M ′⊎O ′ is derived by an application of rule (Time). This























∈ next(E1; S1) and S
′
3
















. Since the invariant of M is satisfied, by an application of rule (Time) we can derive
M
tick

































). By several applications of rule (Par)we can derive thatN⊎O
τ̂
===⇒ N ′′⊎O
and N ′′′ ⊎ O ′
τ̂
===⇒ N ′ ⊎ O ′. In order to conclude the proof, it is sufficient to prove
N ′′ ⊎O
tick
−−−−−→ N ′′′ ⊎O ′. By the definition of rule (Time), from N ′′
tick
























) and S ′
3








) ∪ next(E3; S3). By an application of rule (Time) we have
N ′′ ⊎O
tick
−−−−−→ N ′′′ ⊎O ′ and hence N ⊎O
t̂ick
=====⇒ N ′ ⊎O ′, as required.
• α = unsafe. Suppose that M ⊎ O
unsafe
−−−−−−−→ M ′ ⊎ O ′ is derived by an application of rule
(Safety). This is similar to the case α = cv by considering the fact that ξx < safe implies that
ξx ∪ ξx
′ < safe ∪ safe′, for any ξx ′ and any safe′.
Inductive case. We have to prove that M ⊎ O = M0 ⊎ O0
α1
−−−−→ · · ·
αn
−−−−→ Mn ⊎ On implies
N ⊎O = N0 ⊎O0
α̂1
====⇒ · · ·
α̂n
====⇒ Nn ⊎On . We can use the inductive hypothesis to easily deal
with the first n − 1 actions and resort to the base case to handle the nth action.
(2) We have to prove thatM ⊑ N impliesM ∥ P ⊑ N ∥ P , for any pure-logical process P . This is
a special case of (1) asM ∥ P = M ⊎ (∅; ∅Z P ) and N ∥ P = N ⊎ (∅; ∅Z P ), where ∅; ∅Z P is
a CPS with no physical process in it, only logics.
(3) We have to prove that M ⊑ N implies M\c ⊑ N \c , for any channel c . For any derivation
M\c
t
−−−→ M ′\c we can easily derive thatM
t
−−−→ M ′ with c not occurring in t . SinceM ⊑ N ,
it follows that N
t̂
===⇒ N ′, for some N ′. Since c does not appear in t , we can easily derive that
N \c
t̂
===⇒ N ′\c , as required.
□


















































0:36 R. Lanotte, M. Merro, A. Munteanu, L. Viganò
In order to prove Theorem 2 we adapt to CCPSA two standard lemmata used in process calculi
theory to compose and decompose the actions performed by a compound system.
Lemma 2 (Decomposing system actions). LetM and N be two CPSs in CCPSA. Then,
• ifM ⊎ N
tick
−−−−−→ M ′ ⊎ N ′, for someM ′ and N ′, thenM
tick
−−−−−→ M ′ and N
tick
−−−−−→ N ′;
• ifM ⊎ N
deadlock
−−−−−−−−−→ M ⊎ N , thenM
deadlock





−−−→ M ′⊎N ′, for someM ′ and N ′, due to a channel synchronisation betweenM and N ,
then eitherM
cv
−−−−→ M ′ and N
cv
−−−−→ N ′, orM
cv
−−−−→ M ′ and N
cv
−−−−→ N ′, for some channel c ;
• if M ⊎ N
α
−−−→ M ′ ⊎ N ′, for some M ′ and N ′, α , tick, not due to a channel synchronisation
betweenM and N , then eitherM
α
−−−→ M and N = N ′, or N
α
−−−→ N andM = M ′.
Lemma 3 (Composing system actions). LetM and N be two CPSs of CCPSA. Then,
• IfM
tick
−−−−−→ M ′ and N
tick
−−−−−→ N ′, for someM ′ and N ′, thenM ⊎ N
tick





−−−→ M ′, for some M ′ and α , tick, then M ⊎ N
α
−−−→ M ′ ⊎ N and
N ⊎M
α
−−−→ N ⊎M ′.
Proof of Theorem 2. Here, we prove case (1) of the theorem. The proofs of cases (2) and (3)
are similar to the corresponding ones of Theorem 1.
We prove thatM ⊑m ..n N implies that there arem
′,n′ ∈ N+ ∪∞, withm′..n′ ⊆ m..n such that
M ⊎O ⊑m′ ..n′ N ⊎O . We prove separately thatm
′ ≥ m and n′ ≤ n.
• m′ ≥ m. We recall thatm,m′ ∈ N+. Ifm = 1, then we trivially havem′ ≥ 1 =m. Otherwise,
sincem is the minimum integer for which there is a trace t , with #tick(t ) =m − 1, such that
M
t
−−−→ and N ̸
t̂





===⇒. As done in the proof of case (1) of Theorem 1, we can derive that for any trace t ,
with #tick(t ) < m − 1 and such that M ⊎O
t
−−−→ it holds that N ⊎O
t̂
===⇒. This implies the
required condition,m′ ≥ m.
• n′ ≤ n. We recall that n is the infimum element of N+ ∪ {∞}, n ≥ m, such that whenever
M
t1
−−−→ M ′, with #tick(t1) = n− 1, there is t2, with #tick(t1) = #tick(t2), such that N
t2
−−−→ N ′,
for some N ′, andM ′ ⊑ N ′. Now, ifM ⊎O
t
−−−→ M ′⊎O ′, with #tick(t ) = n− 1, by Lemma 2 we
can split the trace t by extracting the actions performed byM and those performed byO . Thus,
there exist two traces M
t1
−−−→ M ′ and O
t3
−−−→ O ′, with #tick(t1) = #tick(t3) = n − 1 whose
combination has generated the traceM ⊎O
t
−−−→ M ′ ⊎O ′. AsM ⊑m ..n N , fromM
t1
−−−→ M ′
we know that there is a trace t2, with #tick(t1) = #tick(t2), such that N
t2
−−−→ N ′, for some N ′,
andM ′ ⊑ N ′. Since N
t2
−−−→ N ′ and O
t3
−−−→ O ′, by an application of Lemma 3 we can build a
trace N ⊎O
t ′
−−−→ N ′ ⊎O ′, for some t ′ such that #tick(t ) = #tick(t ′) = n − 1. AsM ′ ⊑ N ′, by
Theorem 1 we can derive thatM ′ ⊎O ′ ⊑ N ′ ⊎O ′. This implies that n′ ≤ n.
□
In order to prove Theorem 3, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 4. LetM be an honest and sound CPS, C an arbitrary class of attacks, and A an attack of a
classC ′ ⪯ C . WheneverM ∥ A
t
−−−→ M ′ ∥ A′, thenM ∥ Top(C ) t̂===⇒ M ′ ∥
∏
ι∈I Att (ι, #tick(t )+1,C (ι)).
Proof. Let us define Toph (C ) as the attack process
∏
ι∈I Att (ι,h,C (ι)). Then, Top1 (C ) = Top(C ).
The proof is by mathematical induction on the length k of the trace t .
Base case. k = 1. This means t = α , for some action α . We proceed by case analysis on α .
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• α = cv . As the attacker A does not use communication channels, fromM ∥ A
cv
−−−−→ M ′ ∥ A′
we can derive that A = A′ andM
cv
−−−−→ M ′. Thus, by applications of rules (Par) and (Out) we
deriveM ∥ Top(C )
cv
−−−−→ M ′ ∥ Top1 (C ) = M ′ ∥ Top(C ).
• α = cv . This case is similar to the previous one.
• α = τ . There are five sub-cases.
– LetM ∥ A
τ
−−−→ M ′ ∥ A′ be derived by an application of rule (SensRead). Since the attacker
A performs only malicious actions, from M ∥ A
τ
−−−→ M ′ ∥ A′ we can derive that A = A′
and P
s?v
−−−−−→ P ′ for some process P and P ’ such thatM = E; S Z P andM ′ = E; S Z P ′. By
considering rnd ({true, false}) = false for any process Att (ι, 1,C (ι)), we have that Top(C )
can only perform a tick action, and Top(C )
Es !v
−−−−−−↛ . Hence, by an application of rules (Par)
and (SensRead) we deriveM ∥ Top(C )
τ
−−−→ M ′ ∥ Top1 (C ) = M ′ ∥ Top(C ).
– LetM ∥ A
τ
−−−→ M ′ ∥ A′ be derived by an application of rule (ActWrite). This case is similar
to the previous one.
– Let M ∥ A
τ
−−−→ M ′ ∥ A′ be derived by an application of rule (ESensSniff E). Since M
is sound it follows that M = M ′ and A
Es?v
−−−−−−→ A′. This entails 1 ∈ C ′(Es?) ⊆ C (Es?).
By assuming rnd ({true, false}) = true for the process Att (Es?, 1,C (Es?)), it follows that
Top(C )
Es?v
−−−−−−→ Top1 (C ) = Top(C ). Hence, by applying the rules (Par) and (ESensRead E) we
deriveM ∥ Top(C )
τ
−−−→ M ′ ∥ Top1 (C ) = M ′ ∥ Top(C ).
– Let M ∥ A
τ
−−−→ M ′ ∥ A′ be derived by an application of rule (EActIntgr E). Since M is
sound it follows that M = M ′ and A
Ea!v
−−−−−−→ A′. As a consequence, 1 ∈ C ′(Ea!) ⊆ C (Ea!).
By assuming rnd ({true, false})=true and rnd (R) = v for the process Att (Ea!, 1,C (Ea!)),
it follows that Top(C )
Ea!v
−−−−−−→ Top1 (C ) = Top(C ). Thus, by applying the rules (Par) and
(EActIntegr E) we deriveM ∥ Top(C )
τ
−−−→ M ′ ∥ Top1 (C ) = M ′ ∥ Top(C ).
– Let M ∥ A
τ
−−−→ M ′ ∥ A′ be derived by an application of rule (Tau). Let M = E; S Z P and
M ′ = E ′; S Z P ′. First, we consider the case when P ∥ A
τ
−−−→ P ′ ∥ A′ is derived by an
application of either rule (ESensIntegr E) or rule (EActDrop E). Since M is sound and A can
perform only malicious actions, we have that: (i) either P
s?v
−−−−−→ P ′ and A
Es !v
−−−−−−→ A′ (ii) or
P
a!v
−−−−−→ P ′ and A
Ea?v
−−−−−−→ A′. We focus on the first case as the second one is similar.
Since A
Es !v
−−−−−−→ A′, we derive 1 ∈ C ′(Es!) ⊆ C (Es!), and Top(C )
Es !v
−−−−−−→ Top1 (C ) = Top(C ),
by assuming rnd ({true, false}) = true and rnd (R) = v for the process Att (Es!, 1,C (Es!)).
Thus, by applying the rules (ESensIntegr E) and (Tau) we derive M ∥ Top(C )
τ
−−−→ M ′ ∥
Top1 (C ) = M ′ ∥ Top(C ), as required.
To conclude the proof we observe that if P ∥ A
τ
−−−→ P ′ ∥ A′ is derived by an application
of a rule different from (ESensIntegr E) and (EActDrop E), then by inspection of Table 1 and
by definition of attacker, it follows that A can’t perform a τ -action since A does not use
channel communication and performs only malicious actions. Thus, the only possibility is
that the τ -action is performed by P in isolation. As a consequence, by applying the rules
(Par) and (Tau), we deriveM ∥ Top(C )
τ
−−−→ M ′ ∥ Top1 (C ) = M ′ ∥ Top(C ).
• α = tick. In this case the transitionM ∥ A
tick
−−−−−→ M ′ ∥ A′ is derived by an application of rule
(Time) because M
tick
−−−−−→ M ′ and A
tick
−−−−−→ A′. Hence, it suffices to prove that Top(C )
tick
−−−−−→
Top2 (C ). We consider two cases: 1 ∈ C (ι) and 1 < C (ι). If 1 ∈ C (ι), then the transition
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Att (ι, 1,C (ι))
tick
−−−−−→ Att (ι, 2,C (ι)) can be derived by assuming rnd ({true, false}) = false.
Moreover, since rnd ({true, false}) = false the process Att (ι, 1,C (ι)) can only perform a tick
action. If 1 < C (ι), then the process Att (ι, 1,C (ι)) can only perform a tick action. As a
consequence,Att (ι, 1,C (ι))
tick
−−−−−→ Att (ι, 2,C (ι)) and Top(C )
tick
−−−−−→ Top2 (C ). By an application
of rule (Time), we deriveM ∥ Top(C )
tick
−−−−−→ M ′ ∥ Top2 (C ).
• α = deadlock. This case is not admissible because M ∥ A
deadlock
−−−−−−−−−→ M ′ ∥ A′ would entail
M
deadlock
−−−−−−−−−→ M ′. However,M is sound and it can’t deadlock.
• α = unsafe. Again, this case is not admissible becauseM is sound.
Inductive case (k > 1). We have to prove that M ∥ A
t
−−−→ M ′ ∥ A′ implies M ∥ Top(C ) t̂===⇒ M ′ ∥
Top#tick(t )+1 (C ). Since the length of t is greater than 1, it follows that t = t ′α , for some trace t ′
and some action α . Thus, there exist M ′′ and A′′ such that M ∥ A
t ′
−−−→ M ′′ ∥ A′′
α
−−−→ M ′ ∥ A′.
By inductive hypothesis, it follows that M ∥ Top(C ) t̂
′
===⇒ M ′′ ∥ Top#tick(t
′)+1 (C ). To conclude
the proof, it is enough to show that M ′′ ∥ A′′
α




M ′ ∥ Top#tick(t )+1 (C ). The reasoning is similar to that followed in the base case, except for actions
α = deadlock and α = unsafe that need to be treated separately. We prove the case α = deadlock
as the case α = unsafe is similar.
LetM = E; S Z P . The transitionM ′′ ∥ A
deadlock
−−−−−−−−−→ M ′ ∥ A′ must be derived by an application
of rule (Deadlock). This implies that M ′′ = M ′, A′′ = A′ and the state function of M is not in the
invariant set inv. Thus, by an application of rule (Deadlock) we derive
M ′′ ∥ Top#tick(t
′)+1 (C )
deadlock
−−−−−−−−−→ M ′ ∥ Top#tick(t
′)+1 (C ).
Since #tick(t ) + 1 = #tick(t ′) + #tick(deadlock) + 1 = #tick(t ′) + 1, it follows, as required, that
M ′′ ∥ Top#tick(t
′)+1 (C )
deadlock
−−−−−−−−−→ M ′ ∥ Top#tick(t )+1 (C ) .
□
Everything is finally in place to prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. We have to prove that eitherM ∥ A ⊑ M orM ∥ A ⊑m2 ..n2 M , for some
m2 and n2 such that m2..n2 ⊆ m1..n1 (m2 = 1 and n2 = ∞ if the two systems are completely
unrelated). The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose thatM ∥ A @ M andM ∥ A ⊑m2 ..n2 M ,
withm2..n2 ⊈m1..n1. We distinguish two cases: either n1 = ∞ or n1 ∈ N+.
If n1 = ∞, then it must bem2 < m1. Since M ∥ A ⊑m2 ..n2 M , by Definition 10 there is a trace t ,




===⇒. By Lemma 4, this entailsM ∥ Top(C ) t̂===⇒.
SinceM ̸
t̂
===⇒ and #tick(t ) =m2−1 < m2 < m1, this contradictsM ∥ Top(C ) ⊑m1 ..n1 M .
If n1 ∈ N
+
, thenm2 < m1 and/or n1 < n2, and we reason as in the previous case. □
Proof of Theorem 4. We consider the two parts of the statement separately.
Definitive impact. By an application of Lemma 4 we have thatM ∥ A
t
−−−→ entailsM ∥ Top(C ) t̂===⇒.
This impliesM ∥ A ⊑ M ∥ Top(C ). Thus, ifM ∥ Top(C ) ⊑ M[ξw ← ξw+ξ ], for ξ ∈ R
ˆX
, ξ > 0, then,
by transitivity of ⊑, it follows thatM ∥ A ⊑ M[ξw ← ξw+ξ ].
Pointwise impact. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose ξ ′ > ξ . Since Top(C ) has a
pointwise impact ξ at timem, it follows that ξ is given by:
inf
{
ξ ′′ : ξ ′′∈R
ˆX ∧ M ∥ Top(C ) ⊑m ..n M[ξw ← ξw+ξ ′′],n ∈ N+ ∪∞
}
.
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Similarly, since A has a pointwise impact ξ ′ at timem′, it follows that ξ ′ is given by
inf
{
ξ ′′ : ξ ′′∈R
ˆX ∧ M ∥ A ⊑m′ ..n M[ξw ← ξw+ξ
′′
],n ∈ N+ ∪∞
}
.
Now, ifm =m′, then ξ ≥ ξ ′ becauseM ∥ A
t
−−−→ entailsM ∥ Top(C ) t̂===⇒ due to an application of
Lemma 4. This is contradiction with the fact that ξ < ξ ′. Thus, it must bem′ < m. Now, since both
ξ and ξ ′ are the infimum functions and since ξ ′ > ξ , there are ξ and ξ ′, with ξ≤ξ≤ξ ′≤ξ ′ such that:
(i)M ∥ Top(C ) ⊑m ..n M[ξw ← ξw+ξ ], for some n; (ii)M ∥ A ⊑m′ ..n′ M[ξw ← ξw+ξ ′], for some n′.
FromM ∥ A ⊑m′ ..n′ M[ξw ← ξw+ξ ′] it follows that there exists a trace t with #tick(t ) =m′ − 1
such thatM ∥ A
t
−−−→ andM[ξw ← ξw+ξ ′] ̸
t̂
===⇒. Since ξ ≤ ξ ′, by monotonicity (Proposition 6), we
deduce thatM[ξw ← ξw+ξ ] ̸
t̂
===⇒. Moreover, by Lemma 4M ∥ A
t
−−−→ entailsM ∥ Top(C ) t̂===⇒.
Summarising, there exists a trace t ′ with #tick(t ′) = m′ − 1 such that M ∥ Top(C )
t ′
−−−→ and
M[ξw ← ξw+ξ ] ̸
t̂ ′
===⇒. However, this, together withm′ < m, is in contradiction with the fact (i)
above saying that M ∥ Top(C ) ⊑m ..n M[ξw ← ξw+ξ ], for some n. As a consequence it must be
ξ ′ ≤ ξ andm′ ≤ m. This concludes the proof. □
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